Shared Crisis

Nigeria shares in the security and socio-economic challenges around the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). From the shrinking lake to armed conflicts and the attendant humanitarian crisis in the region. The Boko Haram insurgency has also connected Nigeria with LCB countries such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Given porous borders and other inherent national challenges, the over twelve years of insurgency have become a regional burden. These factors, amongst others, increase neighbourhood effects on the LCB countries. Hence, many affected countries hardly struggle with security and socio-economic challenges in isolation.

The trio of Niger Republic, Cameroon and Chad are in the top twenty most fragile states in the world in 2022, alongside Nigeria. The fragility of these countries predisposes them to encounter local issues from their neighbours. In 2020, President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria held that only God could effectively supervise the borders between his country and the Niger Republic. Such considerations and the narrative of being the ‘giant of Africa’ perhaps moved Nigeria to procure vehicles to aid insecurity containment in the Niger Republic. Beyond security and socio-economic factors, Niger and some parts of Nigeria also share some socio-cultural affinity, especially in pastoral nomadism and religion. The realities between the two countries and other LCB countries mean that inherent local threats should pre-empt readiness from the countries.

State-level threats in West Africa pose concerns for the region. The flow of arms from Libya into the Niger Republic poses a high risk to other West African countries, especially those with internal armed hostilities. Research shows that the fall of Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 led to the arms flow down south. Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) across the region benefit from the movement of arms across borders, pushing violent group interests in many locations in the West African sub-region.

According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), countries in West Africa need to collaborate and stem the tide of weapons flowing from the Niger Republic. Porous border challenges between Nigeria and the Niger Republic increase the likelihood of arms flowing into Nigeria’s troubled violence hotbeds. Winning wars against NSAGs in one country without adequate measures from their neighbours indicates that weapons could move to the waiting arms of criminal networks in those countries where governments have not handled security effectively. ISS’s report affirms that a solution to Libya’s current crisis could increase arms trafficking in neighbouring countries as local demands decreases.

Instability in West Africa is a complex situation requiring isolated and coordinated strategies amongst national governments. Stability in one country could lead to armed actors and weapons movement to less stable neighbouring countries. Therefore, while combative responses are deployed across West Africa’s violent conflict scenes, they should be harmonised towards a holistic regional stability strategy. For instance, four decades after ratifying the Protocol on Free Movement for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and related Protocol on transhumance, it has contributed to the indirect promotion of non-state violence, according to a Nextier SPD publication. There is a need to amend the ECOWAS free movement protocol to meet the current security exigencies troubling the region. Like the Gulf of Guinea, where multi-pronged cooperation is argued as one of the causal factors for reduced piracy, transnational cooperation among the LCB towards porous borders and its discontents may address the issues. Additionally, transnational border management should be preceded by improved efforts by relevant agencies of the respective countries.

Armed groups may have capitalised on existing grievances, conflicts and social inequalities to unleash attacks on security forces and civilian populations. National governments of affected countries must solve inherent socio-economic and political inadequacies that may be fuelling the violent uprising by non-state armed groups and tendencies of violence spillover. Nigeria has witnessed similar trends with attacks on rural residents, herding groups and farming communities. New tensions are also emerging in southern Nigeria, with violent schisms between communities and herding groups, militants, and pro-secessionists versus the Nigerian state. These different dynamic security challenges trigger widespread instability and subsequent state fragility. Achieving stability in West Africa requires national strategies that feed into a holistic regional framework.