Bringing History into the Resolution of Banditry in Zamfara State

Protracted banditry has undermined human and livelihood security in Zamfara State in recent years. Stabilisation efforts through the deployment of kinetic and non-kinetic approaches have not been able to restore peace. This failure is not unconnected with the conflict’s excessive (mis)construction in tribal terms. Indeed, most conflicts in ethnically divided African states are often parochially explained through the ethnic lens or fault lines, leading to blame games and conspiracy theories which often exacerbate rather than mitigate the conflicts (Horowitz, 1985). For example, in the etymology of banditry in Zamfara State, members of the Fulani group have been (mis)construed as purely herders and bandits. At the same time, those of the Hausa extraction were wrongly interpreted as wholly farmers and vigilantes. Yet, Fulani has engaged in farming and formed vigilantes; some Hausa owe cattle and participated in banditry (see Blench, 2005).

Ironically, the (mis)construction and ethnicisation of the banditry has influenced counter-banditry policy making and execution. Moreover, the growing politicisation of the conflict along ethnic fault lines has further exacerbated tensions and undermined peacebuilding efforts. Yet unravelling the history of symbiotic relationships among the conflict actors is a critical step toward actualising sustainable peace in the beleaguered state. As a result, this edition of Nextier SPD Policy Weekly examines the history of banditry in Zamfara State. Furthermore, it highlights how the conflict actors’ grievances can be addressed to halt the palpable descent into anarchy.

The Intractability of Banditry in Zamfara

The endless banditry in Zamfara State has produced untold murder of innocent persons and encampments of several more across the state (see figures 1 and 2). Many schools have been shut the mass abduction of students, such as the over 270 Jangebe pupils in February 2021. Also, scores of people have been gruesomely murdered in the state in the last two years. Understandably, citizens and residents of Zamfara State have responded in three significant ways to banditry. First, some residents have fled their homes and abandoned their livelihoods for safer villages and towns elsewhere, such as internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, or to live with family members and friends. Second, some have entered a truce with the bandits to obey their terms and conditions for cohabitation, including tax payment, to avoid being attacked. For example, bandits who kidnapped three health workers in Zamfara State at the end of June 2022 along the Gusau Dansadau highway in Maru Local Government had to release the hostages following the confirmation of a peace dialogue between the bandits and the farming communities. Third, several citizens and residents have resorted to self-defence and the instrumentalisation of jungle justice.

The government has deployed four strategies with little success in response to the banditry. First, the government has mobilised its security architecture against the bandits by arresting, injuring and neutralising their scores (see figure 3). Second, the government has restricted the opening of markets, use of motorcycles, sales of petrol and operation of mobile telephones in certain areas of Zamfara to curtail the operational mobility of bandits. Third, the government also granted state pardons or amnesty to some leaders of bandit gangs to secure peace. Fourth, the Zamfara State proposed granting firearms licenses to certain residents for self-defence against rampaging bandits. Lastly, the government has resorted to using an appeasement strategy, such as paying 60 million ransom for releasing the nearly 300 Jangebe schoolgirls abducted in February 2021(see figure 4). In June 2022, a notorious Fulani bandit leader who had been declared wanted by the Katsina State Police Command for several massacres was ‘turbaned’ or crowned as the ‘Chief of the Fulani’ in a peace deal.

Bringing History Back into Zamfara Conflict Resolution

The war against banditry in Zamfara State has primarily remained ineffective because of the poor categorisation of conflict actors. This has led to a differential policy targeting the Fulani as herders and bandits on the one hand and Hausa as farmers and vigilantes on the other. Historically, the North-West (including Zamfara State) has operated a caste system since the feudal era. As a result, people in the area have been classified based on their trades rather than ethnic group membership. Thus, there have been three categories of occupational stratification in Zamfara State: cattle owners, herders and farmers (Key Informant Interview). Though the Fulani have traditionally constituted most cattle-owning and herding families, some have also engaged in sedentary farming. Conversely, even though most of the Hausa people were sedentary farmers, some owned and reared cattle (Key Informant Interview). Accordingly, there has not been much religious distinction between herders and farmers in the region, as almost every farmer kept some livestock.

In the last two decades, there has been a southward migration trend among the herding families in their efforts to escape the debilitating effects of climate change on their herds. Many migrated to the North-Central because of the green vegetation in the zone (Key Informant Interview). However, the terrible indigene-settler violence in Plateau State in 2003 resulted in several herds of cattle-killing and rustling. Some surviving herding families relocated to Benue and Taraba states, while some returned to the North-West (Key Informant Interview). Following the huge loss, the majority of the cattleowning families took the few remaining livestock from the herding families, leaving them jobless and angry. With no permanent abode and infinitesimal skill in farming and trade, most former cattle herding families took to cattle rustling for survival. Most cattle owners sold off their herds to reduce rustling and avoid a total loss. With fewer livestock to rustle, the former herding families began to raid rural communities, kidnapping farmers, traders and commuters (Key Informant Interview).

As a result, the farming communities in Zamfara State had to form vigilante groups to protect themselves against bandits. Sadly, they exclusively targeted the Fulani for their woes leading to reprisal attacks and demand for huge ransoms by Fulani gangs who relocated to the forests. Currently, there are over 30,000 Fulani bandits in the forests of North-West Nigeria because of the relocation of Fulani from other West African states to support their kith and kin in Nigeria. As a result, an occupational crisis has morphed into a tribal war (Key Informant Interview).

Addressing Banditry in Zamfara State

Several policy measures are needed to mitigate the complexity of banditry in Zamfara State.

1. Promotion of local peacebuilding: Despite the terrible level of violence in Zamfara State, the conflict actors still adhere to some form of local peace dialogue as deployed by the bandits and some farming communities. The government’s peace processes, such as the amnesty programme, collapsed because of the lack of trust in the government. Thus, there is a need for a bottom-up peacebuilding process with local agencies. This could be engineered by civil society organisations that have enormous credibility at the local level.
2. There is a need for forgiveness. Even though the violent banditry has led to senseless killings and destruction of livelihoods, the conflict actors need to embrace forgiveness and unite for peace. As devastating as the Rwandan genocide was, the victims still found a place in their grieving hearts to forgive the perpetrators of the heinous violence. The communal forgiveness and healing process can be facilitated by a peace and security consulting firm to secure the buy-in and participation of all the parties.
3. There is a need for economic support for jobless persons: Following the high level of cattle rustling and attacks on farming communities, several people have lost their means of livelihood. So, there is a need for economic support for such people to restart their occupations. This will reduce the opportunity for participation in criminal violence such as kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling and armed robbery.
4. More effective border policing is needed: Nigeria’s land borders are notoriously porous, leading to the infiltration of criminals and illegal weapons from other countries. More well-trained officials and state-of-the-art gadgets are needed for better security and policing of the borders.
5. Through the Border Communities Development Agencies(BCDA), the Nigerian state needs to invest more in border communities, making them see themselves as Nigeria despite their relationship with their kits and kins from the neighbouring countries. To secure Nigeria’s borders, border communities need to feel Nigerian and understand the idea of a state and its authority.

Conclusion

The ravaging banditry in Zamfara State is essentially an occupational crisis that has assumed an ethnic colouration. The violent conflict’s etymology has been examined to identify the conflict actors and their grievances. A bottom-up peacebuilding approach is required to mitigate the violence, and forgiveness was done in post-genocide Rwanda. Also, economic support is needed for jobless persons. To curtail the infiltration of illegal aliens and weapons, better-trained officials and state-of-the-art gadgets are required for border security.

References

Blench, R. (2005). Natural Resource Conflicts in North-Central Nigeria: A Handbook and Case Studies, Cambridge: Mallam Dendo

Horowitz, D. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Authors:

Dr Iro Aghedo is an Associate Consultant at Nextier SPD and a Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Benin, Edo State, Nigeria.

Dr Ndu Nwokolo is a Managing Partner and Chief Executive at Nextier SPD and an Honorary Research Fellow, School of Government and Society, University of Birmingham, UK.