Struggle for Guns

Arguably, being armed distinguishes armed groups from other types of actors in most political systems. Actors in Nigeria’s violent conflict scenes are increasing, and so is their need for guns. Across the country, multiple hotbeds of violence exist such that the nation’s security framework appears ineffectual in managing the scale and frequency of incidents. Notable cases include the twelve years of jihadist insurgency, evolving banditry,  civil unrest, violent secession struggles, gang wars, kidnapping, inter-communal conflicts, and farmer-herder crises. The Nextier Violent Conflict Database recorded 1,185 incidents leading to 4,192 deaths in the first eight months of 2022.

Increasing violence and its propensity is pushing conversations on self-defence, gun access, and informal security provisions. Many rural communities, highways and ‘ungoverned’ spaces lay vulnerable to non-state armed groups (NSAGs). The violence trajectory has brought about self-defence militias, investments in vigilanteism, and regional security frameworks such as civilian joint task force (CJTF), Amotekun and Ebubeagu in the northeast, southwest and southeast zones, respectively. In the northwest, on June 2022, the Zamfara state government encouraged residents to bear arms and defend themselves against bandits. Also, the Eastern Security Network, the armed unit of the proscribed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), was purportedly set up to protect Igbo lives and the Southeast region from insecurity, especially activities of pastoralists.

State governments in Nigeria appear to be major subscribers of informal security provisioning. Several states are setting up vigilante units and pushing for them to be armed. However, it appears the federal government is unclear on arms procurement for state security outfits. In Ondo state, Governor Akeredolu claims the federal government is showing double standards by allowing the Katsina state security outfit to bear arms and denying the Amotekun of same rights means “we are pursuing one country, two systems.” The emergence of informal security providers means the demand for guns and, possibly, an increase in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

New concerns for the Nigerian state are to review the evolving security dynamics in the country and the responses so far. It is also at the stage that evidence should inform the next steps in determining the security gaps, challenges of the security organisations, and triggers of armed conflicts across Nigeria. Essentially, there is a need to conduct a holistic evaluation of Nigeria’s security crisis. The evaluation will provide evidence for sustainable solutions.

The emergence of informal security provisions in a deeply divided country may become dangerous. Since violence often takes identity dimensions, informal security actors may become agents of group violence, especially if they are armed, undertrained and poorly regulated. There is a need for informal security units to be regulated in line with conflict and cultural sensitivities in the target areas. Informal security units must hinge on the assumption that such platforms’ idea is to securitise communities and not pique entities against entities. Nigeria’s security crisis is far from checkmated, so informal security actors may continue to increase. Therefore, the creation of supposedly supportive quasi-security units must be preceded by adequate awareness training to enhance the operatives’ knowledge of working in conflict zones.

Given the rise of violence and informal security provisions, the Federal Government of Nigeria must take a clear stand on arming such quasi-security units. There is a need to develop a holistic framework for operationalising informal security units such as vigilantes, Amotekun, Ebubeagu, and others. The holistic framework should be flexible and adaptive to the security realities in the intervention areas. This effort will help to curtail perceptions of federal government bias in responding to violent threats in Nigeria.

Conversations on informal security provisions indicate that existing structures are ineffectual in protecting lives and livelihoods. It also suggests a crisis of confidence if residents do not believe that government can protect them; hence, some people may prefer to be in charge of their safety by pushing for gun access and self-defence militias. This trajectory will breed a disconnect between the public and security organisations. Therefore, as an immediate response, the Nigerian government must be willing to hold conversations on revamping Nigeria’s security framework to match the current dynamics of insecurity in the country.