Unsettling Security

In the last days of October 2022, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja, Nigeria’s seat of power, was in a state of an unsettling security atmosphere. On the 23rd of October, a letter reportedly from the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria warning American citizens about “elevated risks of terror attacks in Nigeria”, especially in Abuja, went viral. Countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland and Australia followed suit with similar risk advisories about imminent terror attacks in Abuja. While reacting to the warnings, Nigeria’s Minister of Information and Culture, Alhaji Lai Mohammed, reportedly asked Nigerians to be alert but not panic. However, the FCT Administration has barred vigilante groups from using firearms. Both reactions pose numerous security questions for the country.

In recent years, Nigeria’s security crisis has witnessed an uptick in the spread of violence across the nation. Banditry in the northwest region is spreading to parts of the northcentral, while insurgency has continued in the northeast for over twelve years. Several reports indicate that jihadist terrorists in the northeast collude with bandits in the northwest and northcentral zones. In addition, the relatively peaceful southeast region has seen a rise in violent secession struggles and the menace of ‘unknown gunmen’. There are also episodic threats from militants in the Niger Delta and cases of gang wars,  highway violence, communal clashes and extra-judicial killings nationwide.

In all these, the Nigerian government has maintained optimism about Nigeria’s security outlook. However, there are also times when government officials’ comments contradicted available data and anecdotal accounts of violence victims in the violent hotspots. Other times, key public officials have encouraged residents to defend themselves against agents of terror, indicating the incapacity of the Nigerian state to protect lives and livelihoods. Therefore, the assurances of Alhaji Mohammed may not fly among Abuja residents.

Banning armed vigilante operations to manage the threats in Abuja is dicey. Vigilantism in Nigeria has surged due to the ubiquity of armed conflicts and apparent ineffectual securitisation. Several non-state armed groups have emerged in response to the gaps. While outfits such as Hisbah, Civilian Joint-Task Force (C-JTF), Amotekun, and  Ebubeagu have state backing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN) lacks state support being the armed wing of the proscribed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Also in existence are small-scale self-defence groups providing securitisation functions in different localities nationwide. In Abuja, many settlements and suburbs have vigilantes providing security services, especially at night.

Undoubtedly, banning vigilante outfits in Abuja may limit their operations’ effectiveness since many of Nigeria’s non-state armed groups (NSAGs) are sophistically armed. Hence, unarmed vigilante units will likely stand no combative chance. Nevertheless, the FCT Administration’s position aligns with Nigeria’s constitution, which prevents such quasi-security units from bearing arms. However, several, if not all, informal security units bear arms such as Dane guns, single-barrel rifles, machetes, clubs and other locally made weapons. Therefore, the perceived threat of vigilantism may be a regulation problem.

Given that vigilantism or informal securitisation has become a consistent feature of Nigeria’s security framework, it is necessary to revamp its regulations. First, there is a need to invest in periodic capacity building of informal security units across the country. This will be a means to ensure their activities and modus operandi are in sync with formal securitisation protocols. It is also an opportunity to sensitise their operations to reduce cases of extra-judicial killings and other human rights abuses. The capacity building will also improve their effectiveness and partnership with formal security institutions such as the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the Nigeria Armed Forces and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). The vigilantism surge and conversations should culminate in a national regulatory framework.

Banning armed vigilantism in Abuja should mean greater commitments by Nigeria’s formal security agencies. As argued above, unarmed vigilantes have lower chances of success against heavily armed criminals if they do not have immediate formal security agencies’ support. Therefore, there is a need to deploy security personnel in vulnerable hotspots across the nation’s capital beyond the timelines suggested by the warnings. Moreover, the analysis in Surrounded by Terror indicates that Abuja may not be immune to the terror recorded in other parts of the country. Generally, the rise of terror across the board should mean greater efforts to deploy effective strategies tailored to the specific crisis types.