Politics of Group Conflicts

Reducing violent conflicts within African countries to only ethnoreligious tensions is an oversimplification that seeks to distract from the main driving components. Issues, such as politicising wealth, power and status distribution amongst the citizens of various ethnic and religious backgrounds, emphasise the differences in identity, thereby forming a bedrock for potential violent clashes. Violent conflicts in Africa are not always fuelled by ethnoreligious differences alone, but in some circumstances, the political mobilisation of supporters to pursue authority, riches, and resources by various ethnoreligious groups plays a significant part. Bruce Gilley, in ‘Against the concept of ethnic conflict’, maintains that ethnic groups in Africa largely cohabit peacefully with significant levels of interethnic and religious mixing thanks to interethnic and religious marriages, economic alliances, and similar values. However, this does not limit the extent to which differences in identity affect the community negatively.

An ethnic group is the primary mechanism of social identity construction in the continent, forming the basis of many group mobilisations. Ethnoreligious mobilisation is frequently made possible by the political decisions taken by states. In a nutshell, ‘ethnoreligious conflicts’ frequently arise in multi-ethnic, multi-religious, impoverished societies when the state is seen as being dominated by one group or community within it, when communities feel marginalised, or when there is no effective way to address grievances. Instead of an innate animosity, ethnoreligious thought and mobilisation typically derive from unequal access to power and resources. In Greed or Grievance in Civil War, Collier and Hoeffler argue that internal rebellion impedes development and hurts the world’s poorest countries. Using a grievance-rebellion model, both scholars explain how inter-group hatred, political exclusion, and vengeance are triggers of violent conflicts (civil wars, armed conflicts, identity-related conflicts), particularly in multi-ethnic societies.

Furthermore, In Nigeria, inter-group tensions are prevalent. A prime example is the intermittent violence between Christians and Muslims in Jos, the capital of Nigeria’s highly varied Plateau State. The commonly used term for such violence is “communal conflict.” However, this description largely ignores some of the structural features of Nigeria’s federal structure that encourage this violence. In this system, subnational governments wield considerable power, accounting for almost 80 per cent of the nation’s GDP. Besides the effects of resource distribution, local governments designate residents as “indigenes” or “settlers.” In addition to being prohibited from taking some state government jobs, settlers are also not entitled to state funding for their children’s education. This results in Hausa-speaking Muslims in Plateau State being labelled as settlers even though their families have been there for many generations. Furthermore, violent conflicts in Nigeria, especially in northern parts, have created new identities such as internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, returnees, and host communities. These new identities have equally led to new socioeconomic struggles and tensions.

Subsequently, group conflicts in Nigeria must be examined differently. Redirecting focus to the political causes of violent conflicts after establishing that ethnicity and religion are instruments rather than the main factors in intergroup conflict is key to achieving social cohesion and stability. The fact that there is a mobilisation phase before a conflict also emphasises the importance of early actions before ethnic sentiments are stoked. By promoting ethnoreligious variety, consideration for minority rights, power-sharing, and checks and balances, state institutions and structures lessen the sense of unfairness and insecurity that encourages ethnic mobilisation. In this respect, the legal system is crucial. A fair legal system also allows civil society organisations to unite around topics of shared interest, such as human rights, development, and accountability that cut beyond ethnic boundaries. In turn, this makes group interactions easier. Business groups, religious organisations, and artist collectives are a few examples of civil society organisations that can bridge ethnoreligious divides and constructively interact with the government.

Ultimately, security agencies should be proactive in intergroup conflicts to stop ethnoreligious tensions from spiralling out of control. The law enforcement units need to be taught how to react in a fair-minded but forceful way that inspires faith in the state’s ability to make a positive contribution. Since most ethnoreligious violence occurs locally along a faultline separating neighbouring communities, proactive efforts are crucial before additional triggers are set off. The fact that ethnic triggers are local also emphasises the necessity of comprehensive security force training. This emphasises understanding cultural dynamics and conflict context to inform tailored interventions and the achievement of durable peace.

Humans have the propensity to emphasise intergroup distinctions. Many communities have discovered means to stop these inclinations from polarising and degenerating into violence. Understanding the political factors that contribute to ethnoreligious conflict in Africa might help focus attention on fresh approaches to conflict prevention and boost the effectiveness of current initiatives.