The Challenges of Reintegration

Nigeria has been grappling with the insurgency of Boko Haram and its splinter faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), for over a decade. These groups have perpetrated widespread violence, leading to the displacement of millions and the destruction of infrastructure. Jihadist terrorism has raged on and mainly devastated the North East and parts of the Lake Chad basin. Over the years, the Nigerian government has employed non-kinetic measures to address the conflict.

Nigeria’s efforts date back to 2013 when the Goodluck Jonathan administration extended an olive branch to Boko Haram leaders and created a framework for amnesty and disarmament—this targeted combatants (low-level members) who voluntarily surrendered to the Nigerian government. However, the group rejected the amnesty. A new agency called “Countering Violent Extremism” (National Security Corridor) was formed to tackle the root causes of recruitment into Boko Haram and create a process of rehabilitating defectors of the group. Other attempts followed, including the de-radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration programme, codenamed Operation Safe Corridor, which is currently in operation. The programme provides an avenue for the prosecution of high-risk defectors and a 52-week intensive de-radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration programme for moderates. However, a host of challenges have occurred in attaining successful reintegration.

The reintegration of former terrorists into communities has been hard to achieve because of the resentment of victims and their families. Since 2016, the Nigerian government has only been able to reintegrate 500 former fighters despite the government’s deployment of strategic communication. Many residents of towns like Maiduguri and Gwoza protested against the reintegration program. Despite the Borno State governor’s expression of 90 per cent confidence in the genuineness of repentant terrorists, communities that lost several lives, homes and livelihoods to terrorism have hardly been swayed. They believe that the repentant terrorists would re-offend. This resistance is fuelled by deep-seated mistrust and fear, making social reintegration particularly difficult.

A lack of sustainable livelihood opportunities has also surfaced. In Yobe State, many rehabilitated ex-combatants have struggled to find employment or start businesses. Despite efforts to provide vocational training, the region’s lack of a robust economic infrastructure and high unemployment rates have limited their ability to reintegrate economically. This has resulted in some individuals reverting to criminal activities for survival. Corruption and mismanagement of funds further hinder the effectiveness of reintegration initiatives. For instance, the Borno State government has repeatedly reported inadequate funding from the federal government to support the rehabilitation and reintegration of former insurgents. This financial shortfall has led to insufficient provision of services and support for the repentant terrorists. There also exists the challenge of recidivism. This is such that former terrorists revert to their old ways, especially if reintegration programmes fail to address their needs adequately. This poses a significant security threat not only to local communities but also to national stability. Over the years, there have been reports of some of the former Boko Haram members who went through the de-radicalisation and reintegration process were rearrested for engaging in criminal activities or attempting to rejoin Boko Haram. This recurrence underscores the difficulty in ensuring that all rehabilitated individuals do not relapse into violent behaviours.

The reintegration of repentant terrorists in Nigeria’s violent conflict theatre is marred with challenges. There is a need to assess the programme by studying the target communities for reintegration and reviewing gaps in reintegration programmes. There is also a need to improve efforts at building trust between former terrorists and local communities, which is essential. This can be facilitated through community engagement programmes, dialogue, and reconciliation processes that involve victims and perpetrators of violence. Providing vocational training, education, and job opportunities can help integrate former terrorists into society. Economic support should be tailored to the local context. Also, implementing robust monitoring and evaluation systems can help track reintegrated individuals’ progress and assess the reintegration programmes’ effectiveness.