Responding to Violence

Violence in Nigeria has created new security actors and concerns. Formal security agencies appear ineffectual in managing the scale of security challenges across the country. Various response by the federal government, including the deployment of armed forces, has not improved the nation’s security situation. As a result, some state governments, contrary to the federal government\’s position, which appears to oppose the creation of state police, formed regional alliances by creating informal security frameworks to tackle insecurity in their regions. Regional security actors such as the Amotekun in Southwest Nigeria and Ebube-agu in the Southeast have complimented formal security efforts. Hisbah, vigilante units, civilian joint task force (C-JTF), and local hunters are also security providers in northern Nigeria. The emergence of these groups comes with new concerns, especially regarding power abuse and allegations of extrajudicial killings.

Beyond responses from some state governments, civilians appear inclined to take up arms in self-defence. While political officeholders nudge some, others are moved by survival traits and group identity. For example, in June 2022, the Zamfara state government encouraged residents to bear arms and defend themselves against bandits. In addition, local vigilantes and neighbourhood watch have become prevalent in many locations, given the propensity of crime and poor responses from security agencies. Also, the Eastern Security Network, the armed unit of the proscribed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), was purportedly set up to protect Igbo lives and the Southeast region from insecurity, especially activities of pastoralists.

Informal and unregulated security responses will likely birth new challenges. The proliferation of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and small and light weapons (SALWs) arguably go hand in hand. Therefore, increasing informal security providers, including those unregulated by the Nigerian state, will create more gun demands. Furthermore, formal security units are already plagued by allegations of extrajudicial killings and unprofessionalism. Such a trend of impunity and human rights violations will likely trail informal security providers. For example, about seven people returning from a wedding were reportedly killed by Ebube-agu operatives without provocation in Awomamma in Imo state. The community are said to be itching for retaliation.

Policing deeply divided societies is a complicated process. Informal security provisions may be created along ethnoreligious lines and interests. Therefore, it will lead to the weaponisation of identity groups and inherent violence. For example, the farmer-herder crisis has often led to armed clashes between the socio-economic groups, with each group claiming self-defence and protection. Unregulated informal security actors may ginger more violent conflicts between Nigeria’s deeply divided sub-populations and complicate security provisions by the Nigerian state. Therefore, there is a need for the Nigerian government to implement a range of actions given Nigeria’s security status.

The Nigerian government must tackle the need for guns. Violent conflicts threaten lives and livelihoods, and weaken the social contract and government’s supposed gun monopoly. Nigeria must commit to managing structural vulnerabilities that heighten the need for guns. The continuous inclination to bear arms largely stems from insecurity, an unbalanced allocation distribution framework, grievances and a flawed criminal justice system. Efforts must be focused on managing violent conflicts and increasing the efficiency of security personnel. These measures will discourage resort to self-help and group-level armed defence systems. The gun demand and its proliferation will reduce when there are fewer resorts to violent conflicts.

There is a need for informal security units to be regulated in line with conflict and cultural sensitivities in the target areas. Informal security units must hinge on the assumption that such platforms’ idea is to securitise communities and not pique entities against entities. Nigeria’s security crisis is far from checkmated, so informal security actors may continue to increase. Therefore, the creation of supposedly supportive quasi-security units must be preceded by adequate awareness training to enhance the operatives’ knowledge of working in conflict zones. Neutrality and professionalism will help avoid the looming dangers of tensions between informal security divisions and communities. A robust punishment and reward strategy within the security organisations will help shape the conduct of security personnel in the field. The Nigerian government must tactically regulate the activities of informal security providers to ensure sustainable stability.