NextierSPD

The intensity of violence in Nigeria poses significant risks for school children. Several places of learning have turned to piles of ruin due to attacks by non-state armed groups. Instances are more prevalent in Nigeria’s northeast zone, where the insurgency has been well over twelve years. In the northwest and northcentral zones, banditry also poses significant threats to education due to large-scale kidnappings at places of learning. In the southeast zone, school activities are suspended on Mondays and other designated sit-at-home days by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB).

Ubiquitous terror significantly constrains school enrolment in Nigeria. The country has an out-of-school children problem, estimated at 18.5 million children. The figure is a sharp rise from 10.5 million recorded in 2021. UNICEF links the surge to northeast terrorism and banditry in the northwest and northcentral regions. Beyond the violence, there are limitations, often based on security risks, in supporting many children trapped in conflict-impacted environments. Also, many children live in conflict zones with limited social services. Education services appear to be secondary in the face of a prolonged humanitarian crisis.

Continued constraints in accessing education will worsen the poverty statistics. The younger population are denied educational opportunities, which will affect their self-development, productivity, self-reliance and vulnerabilities. Given the proliferation of non-state armed groups, recruits are needed to fill up their rank and file. Hence, out-of-school, unskilled and unproductive demographics are vulnerable to the antics of violent entrepreneurs. According to the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), quality education protects cognitive development and psychosocial well-being, giving children hope in times of crisis. To provide educational services to millions of deprived children in Nigeria means to sustainably address structural, cultural, security and humanitarian factors that limit children’s access to education.

The Nigerian government must rethink the provision of education services, especially in conflict-impacted locations. There is a need to invest in the capacity development of the existing teaching workforce in information and communication technology (ICT) skills. This can ensure that children in displacement camps, for instance, can remotely be taught in a controlled environment, especially where school infrastructure has been destroyed. Remote learning can also be mainstreamed on a broader scale to cater for school children in Southeast Nigeria who cannot go to school on designated IPOB sit-at-home days. The practicability of remote learning will ensure that children living in areas where government agencies and development actors cannot access can receive quality education irrespective of the teaching staff strength in those locations.

The semi-digitalisation of teaching in public schools does not excuse the urgency of tackling Nigeria’s security woes. However, it is a temporary solution to ensure that accessible conflict-affected children in Nigeria are not deprived of education while security agencies continue to push for stability. Therefore, security actors must focus on restoring peace and stability in areas affected by conflict. In addition, the government must deploy non-conflict intervention measures to de-escalate emerging and existing violent hotspots.

More livelihood, nutrition, and child protection programmes are needed to salvage many Nigerian children’s current challenges. The future of children in crisis-impacted zones may appear uncertain, but adequate intervention efforts will ensure positive outcomes. Beyond education, violent conflict affects all aspects of children’s lives. Therefore, addressing the humanitarian impact of violent conflict issues in Nigeria will help prevent its implication on education and other socio-economic activities. The effects of violent conflicts on education in Nigeria require a tailored solution to each crisis type and location. It also requires that sustainability be achieved by upscaling interventions that significantly impact the lives of communities and children.

Violence in Nigeria has created new security actors and concerns. Formal security agencies appear ineffectual in managing the scale of security challenges across the country. Various response by the federal government, including the deployment of armed forces, has not improved the nation’s security situation. As a result, some state governments, contrary to the federal government\’s position, which appears to oppose the creation of state police, formed regional alliances by creating informal security frameworks to tackle insecurity in their regions. Regional security actors such as the Amotekun in Southwest Nigeria and Ebube-agu in the Southeast have complimented formal security efforts. Hisbah, vigilante units, civilian joint task force (C-JTF), and local hunters are also security providers in northern Nigeria. The emergence of these groups comes with new concerns, especially regarding power abuse and allegations of extrajudicial killings.

Beyond responses from some state governments, civilians appear inclined to take up arms in self-defence. While political officeholders nudge some, others are moved by survival traits and group identity. For example, in June 2022, the Zamfara state government encouraged residents to bear arms and defend themselves against bandits. In addition, local vigilantes and neighbourhood watch have become prevalent in many locations, given the propensity of crime and poor responses from security agencies. Also, the Eastern Security Network, the armed unit of the proscribed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), was purportedly set up to protect Igbo lives and the Southeast region from insecurity, especially activities of pastoralists.

Informal and unregulated security responses will likely birth new challenges. The proliferation of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and small and light weapons (SALWs) arguably go hand in hand. Therefore, increasing informal security providers, including those unregulated by the Nigerian state, will create more gun demands. Furthermore, formal security units are already plagued by allegations of extrajudicial killings and unprofessionalism. Such a trend of impunity and human rights violations will likely trail informal security providers. For example, about seven people returning from a wedding were reportedly killed by Ebube-agu operatives without provocation in Awomamma in Imo state. The community are said to be itching for retaliation.

Policing deeply divided societies is a complicated process. Informal security provisions may be created along ethnoreligious lines and interests. Therefore, it will lead to the weaponisation of identity groups and inherent violence. For example, the farmer-herder crisis has often led to armed clashes between the socio-economic groups, with each group claiming self-defence and protection. Unregulated informal security actors may ginger more violent conflicts between Nigeria’s deeply divided sub-populations and complicate security provisions by the Nigerian state. Therefore, there is a need for the Nigerian government to implement a range of actions given Nigeria’s security status.

The Nigerian government must tackle the need for guns. Violent conflicts threaten lives and livelihoods, and weaken the social contract and government’s supposed gun monopoly. Nigeria must commit to managing structural vulnerabilities that heighten the need for guns. The continuous inclination to bear arms largely stems from insecurity, an unbalanced allocation distribution framework, grievances and a flawed criminal justice system. Efforts must be focused on managing violent conflicts and increasing the efficiency of security personnel. These measures will discourage resort to self-help and group-level armed defence systems. The gun demand and its proliferation will reduce when there are fewer resorts to violent conflicts.

There is a need for informal security units to be regulated in line with conflict and cultural sensitivities in the target areas. Informal security units must hinge on the assumption that such platforms’ idea is to securitise communities and not pique entities against entities. Nigeria’s security crisis is far from checkmated, so informal security actors may continue to increase. Therefore, the creation of supposedly supportive quasi-security units must be preceded by adequate awareness training to enhance the operatives’ knowledge of working in conflict zones. Neutrality and professionalism will help avoid the looming dangers of tensions between informal security divisions and communities. A robust punishment and reward strategy within the security organisations will help shape the conduct of security personnel in the field. The Nigerian government must tactically regulate the activities of informal security providers to ensure sustainable stability.

Many rural communities in Nigeria\’s northwest and northcentral regions face severe and constant attacks by armed bandits. For example, in Katsina State, bandits ambushed Buhari\’s advance convoy on its way to Daura, the President\’s country home. In the same state, a news report holds that the Katsina State Government has shut down about 69 health facilities due to insecurity. Across parts of northwest and northcentral Nigeria, where banditry is strife, several communities are troubled by constant attacks and humanitarian implications.

In the bandits-rampaged northwest Nigeria, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)\’s report holds that about 71,289 people have been displaced in Sokoto state, leading to border movement of at least 80,900 Nigerian refugees into the Niger Republic between January and March 2022. In 2021, the Nextier Violent Conflict Database recorded 444 banditry incidents leading to 2,376 deaths in Nigeria\’s northwest and northcentral zones. According to the Database, about 2,057 deaths resulting from 357 banditry cases have been recorded in the first half of 2022. Banditry in Nigeria\’s troubled zones is intensifying and spreading across states. The audacity of bandits has also deepened.

Nigeria\’s Federal Capital Territory (FCT) is increasingly susceptible to the wave of violence in neighbouring states. In 2021, 14 cases of violent attacks led to 8 deaths, based on tracked data from the Nextier Violent Conflict Database. In the first six months of 2022, 17 banditry-related incidents leading to 15 deaths have been recorded in FCT Abuja. Specific crisis types from the Nextier Violent Conflict Database include gunmen attacks, kidnappings, and activities of hoodlums. On Tuesday night, 5th July 2022, a correctional facility in Kuje Area Council in the FCT was attacked by suspected terrorists. About 300 inmates, including members of Boko Haram, are reported to have escaped the facility. Tuesday\’s prison attack in Nigeria\’s capital re-echoes the nation\’s worsening insecurity. It also reinforces the argument that the nation\’s capital may not be immune to the spike in violent attacks across the country despite accommodating headquarters of indigenous security organisations.

FCT Abuja should be the oasis of stability in Nigeria, given its seat of power status and the presence of security organisations. However, recent incidents puncture this assumption. Capital cities are usually the last line of defence against terror. Kabul, Afghanistan\’s capital, was the last to fall to the Talibans\’ onslaught. In Ethiopia, rebel groups have joined forces to defeat the Ethiopian government, complicating frantic efforts to save the nation. These examples show that once armed conflict gets to the state\’s capital, the aim is a total takeover of powers and resources from government\’s control.

The Nigerian government must declare a state of emergency on security. Recurrent violent attacks weaken the state\’s legitimacy and ability to protect its citizens. Indeed, the perception of the state as the provider of security is withering. As a result, calls and encouragement for self-help have increased. For example, in Zamfara State, the state government is positioned to allow citizens to bear arms to protect themselves from raging banditry. Beyond this, security provisioning has proliferated between state governments and non-state actors. These responses indicate that current security structures cannot manage Nigeria\’s trajectory of terror attacks. It is also worrisome how multiple and often disjointed security responses by state and non-state actors can worsen the security climate.

The Nigerian government should increase its early warning and early response mechanisms. Recurrent attacks suggest that intelligence gathering may be under-utilised. The securitisation efforts should be able to monitor activities that provide logistical support to terror groups. Furthermore, specific legislation and prosecutions will ensure that informants and enablers face justice. It will serve as a deterrence for future offenders. Nigeria\’s classification of bandits as terrorists should mean removing the \’kids\’ glove\’. Since bandits have transitioned, so should security responses. Also, the proliferation and dynamism of non-state armed groups should mean that combative and non-combative measures are adequately updated to reflect and respond to new violent conflict trends.

In 2022, thousands of Nigerians continue to make their way out of the nation\’s violent scenes. Places once home and sources of livelihood are either deserted, turned into piles of ruin or both. The deserters or survivors of armed groups\’ terror find refuge in displacement camps and host communities within and outside the Nigerian turf, where they face a humanitarian crisis. In the bandits-rampaged northwest Nigeria, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) \’s report holds that about 71,289 people have been displaced in Sokoto state, leading to border movement of at least 80,900 Nigerian refugees into the Niger Republic between January and March 2022. Within UNHCR\’s review period, the Nextier Violent Conflict Database recorded 175 violent incidents leading to 1,030 deaths and 725 kidnap victims.

Beyond the northwest, over 2.5 million people are displaced in northeast Nigeria and the broader Lake Chad Basin (LCB) by over twelve years of jihadist terrorism. Due to the unending terror incidents, over 35,000 people. About 10.6 million people in the region require urgent humanitarian assistance. The United Nations and partner organisations aim to provide life-saving assistance to 7.8 million of the most vulnerable. Nigeria contributes 4.3 per cent of the 79.5 million global figures, making her one of the top 10 countries with the highest risks of humanitarian disaster. The unending northeast conflict has prolonged chances of a return to normalcy. Continued displacement resulting from the conflict has pushed many residents of the BAY states into extreme margins of vulnerability, especially in displacement camps where they seek refuge and assistance. Many of the northeast displaced population are in overburdened camps where humanitarian crises are profound and basic human necessities are sparse.

Due to the proliferation of violent conflict across the board, several other locations face various challenges. Southeast Nigeria is burdened by \’unknown gunmen\’ terror and secessionist aggression. In the south-south and southwest, militancy and gang war are recurrent. These security issues contribute to safety threats, especially in rural locations. Nigeria\’s rural dwellers fleeing violent scenes and increasing vulnerabilities lurking in ungoverned spaces indicate growing rural and urban pull. Across many rural communities, violent conflicts limit access to farmlands and other agricultural activities, disrupting rural settlements\’ market days and livelihood sources. Violence in Nigeria has contributed to mass movements within and outside Nigeria.

The Nigerian government must take charge of the country\’s troubling violence and humanitarian crises. The gaps in assisting the affected population have created an opportunity for terror groups to deploy make-shift governance and intervention in affected communities. Improving livelihood support in conflict zones will help mitigate the vulnerabilities residents face. However, communities must be safe from terror attacks to achieve these gains. Therefore, security interventions should run concurrently with sufficient humanitarian interventions for crisis-impacted communities. Beyond stability, the government must win the hearts and minds of people through development assistance and efforts to help them rebuild their lives.

Social inclusion is necessary to manage human migration. Implementing social programmes predicated on inclusion will help ensure social services are available to people regardless of where they reside in the country. Creating safe cities includes social inclusion, which implies social integration and cohesion. It enables a wide range of stakeholders to make the best of the city\’s opportunities and participate actively in decision-making. Nigerians fleeing from violence should be able to access life necessities wherever they seek refuge. Therefore, the Nigerian government should mobilise development organisations to increase and harmonise humanitarian assistance in the crisis hotspots.

Managing non-state armed groups\’ violence should focus on the causes and effects. Government should increase military operations in the zones affected by terror. The security measures should include reclaiming terror groups\’ strongholds and re-establishing the government\’s presence in the ungoverned spaces. Greater and more efficient military responses will preserve lives and prevent the impact of lost livelihood opportunities for the local population. Safety and stability in the affected areas will help to prevent the need to flee from violence. Impacted livelihoods and denied opportunities due to insecurity will deepen socio-economic and development deficits in the regions. Timely and adequate security responses will secure the areas from further ruin and set the pathway for sustainable recovery and development.

Mob violence has dotted Nigeria\’s history. Usually manifesting as group violence and \’jungle justice\’, the picture of many incidents are attacks, arson, walk of shame, condemnation without trial, death by clubs, burning tyres, sticks and stones. While mob attacks often have an underlying group narrative and purpose, jungle justice actors are usually brought together by the \’call\’ of dispensing justice to victims. Jungle justice perpetrators disperse as quickly as they gather, such that there is scarcely anyone to answer for the crimes. In some cases, the victims are wrongfully accused. For example, on May 12th 2022, a sound engineer was killed by a mob of motorcyclists in Lagos state.

The statistics of mob violence in Nigeria show various perpetrators, cutting across ethnic groups, religious fanatics, and others, drawn together by circumstances. Data from the Nextier Violent Conflict Database recorded 18 incidents of mob attacks, with 23 deaths in 2021. In the first five months of 2022, notable incidents of mob violence in Nigeria include the vandalisation of the M.K.O. Abiola National Stadium by aggrieved football spectators and the killing of Deborah Samuel for blasphemy in Sokoto state. On May 19th 2022, an altercation ensued between market traders and motorcyclists at Dei-Dei, a building materials hub in Abuja, Nigeria\’s capital. The incident led to mob violence that destroyed several properties, including market stalls and warehouses. Between January and May 2022, 14 deaths have resulted from 8 violent mob incidents in Nigeria. In the last 23 months, the Nextier Violent Conflict Database show there have been at least 35 cases of mob violence leading to 62 casualties and properties that have been destroyed.

Although mob violence is not a Nigerian phenomenon, its occurrence can be aided by certain inherent conditions. There are perceptions of corruption and lack of trust by Nigerians about security agencies\’ handling of criminal cases. There is also the disregard for the criminal justice system, which is often viewed as tardy in dispensing justice. A 2014 survey conducted by NOI-POLL, a country-specific polling service in West Africa, revealed that 51 per cent of Nigerians attribute the high prevalence of jungle justice to a \’lack of trust in the law enforcement agencies. This distrust is portrayed in the predisposition to seek jungle justice and reprisal attacks in place of engaging appropriate agencies for redress.

Crowd mentality and ineffective securitisation also aid mob violence. The politicisation and weaponisation of group identities to pursue value, protection and revenge-seeking fuels the instances of mob violence. Le Bon in The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind holds that crowd behaviour is essentially contagious such that one person\’s excitement, anger or violence can quickly be picked up by others. This scenario appears more realistic in mobs that share similar identities and purposes. On the security side, ineffective securitisation, especially reactive efforts, can give ample room for relatively minor altercations to snowball into mob violence. The aftermath of mob violence goes beyond the losses of lives and properties, especially where group affiliations are involved. Therefore, they often have ethnoreligious implications, especially for Nigeria and other culturally diverse countries.

To reduce the propensity of mob violence in Nigeria is to engage in isolated and interrelated actions. First is promoting national cohesion as a panacea for building tolerance and peace among Nigeria\’s multiple sub-populations. Therefore, the Nigerian government and its development partners should increase programming activities geared towards national cohesion. It is essential also to explore what socio-culturally diverse communities are doing to live in harmony. Then, such practices can be enhanced and replicated.

There is a need to revamp Nigeria\’s criminal justice system to manage current realities. Pre-colonial Nigeria may have practised semblances of present-day jungle justice. According to Obarisiagbon (2018), various indigenous societies that later made up Nigeria had multiple forms of social control and administration of justice. Civil and criminal matters mainly were publicly heard, and justice ranged from public flogging and restitution to banishment. However, with the advent of the British colonial government, the modern-day administration of criminal justice replaced the pre-colonial practices, although the essence of both structures was to ensure peace, safety and social order. Arguably, the failure of these new structures to uphold the criminal justice system largely led to the spread of self-help, which includes jungle justice. According to reports, out of the nearly 74,000 inmates in Nigeria, only about 24,000 have been convicted. This means that almost 70 per cent of the total prison population is awaiting trial. The delay in getting justice contrasts with the quick and dirty mob action to hastily ensure that suspected criminals are not lost to the slow-paced criminal justice system.

Nigeria\’s security organisations should commit to a more proactive securitisation and additional training on managing riots. Proactive engagements, early warning and response mechanisms will help prevent the escalation of full-blown violence. In addition, increased training for riot police personnel will create a readily available and tactical team that can effectively handle civil unrest. Unfortunately, Nigeria\’s security operatives are drawn to multiple violent hotbeds in the country. Given the nature of security challenges and other interrelated issues, the propensity for mob violence in Nigeria may remain high.

Trouble in southeast Nigeria has continued on an ugly path since the first five months of 2022. The region\’s woes are recurrent, from unknown gunmen to alleged secession-based networks. States in the area have transitioned from relative peace to unending terror tales. The violence manifests as kidnapping, beheading of victims, razing of public and private infrastructure, and brutal attacks on security personnel, people perceived to be politicians or members of the ruling class. Also, socio-economic activities are halted on Mondays and other designated sit-at-home days. The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) is responsible for recent self-rule agitations in the region and has adopted sit-at-home orders as a civil disobedience strategy. Different forms of violent conflicts may also have been birthed in the southeast.

Tracked data from the Nextier Violent Conflict Database in the first five months of 2022 shows that Anambra state is the most violent in the region. Within the review period, 46 incidents leading to 94 deaths were recorded in the state. Imo state follows from a distance with 45 deaths in 41 cases. Enugu and Ebonyi states recorded 19 incidents (35 casualties) and 17 incidents (23 casualties), respectively. Ironically, Abia state, where Nnamdi Kanu, IPOB\’s leader, hails from, is the least violent southeast state in 2022, with 12 incidents resulting in 17 deaths. Due to unaddressed risk factors, the violence statistics in the region may increase.

Anambra state has three out of the region\’s top five worst-hit local government areas based on the Nextier Violent Conflict Database review period. The trio of Awka North, Ihiala and Aguata recorded 50 deaths in 18 reported incidents. Coincidentally, the death spike in Anambra state is within the same window as the new governor\’s assumption of office and current drive to bring peace to the state and region in general. There is room to argue that the spike in \’unknown gunmen\’ and self-rule agitators\’ activities in the state is to thwart such stabilisation efforts. Comparing tracked 2022 data with that of 2021 supports this position. Anambra was the third most violent state in the region throughout 2021, with 85 deaths in 38 incidents. It is also arguable that other unclear factors may be playing out in the area.

Ending the region\’s statistics of death will be a bumpy ride. The waves of pro-secessionist struggle will complicate securitisation efforts. Moreover, anecdotal accounts perceive some security operations as oppressive given the rise of pro-Biafran agitations. Amnesty International Report of repressive campaigns by Nigerian security forces in the regions supports this assertion. Also, accusations and counter-accusations are trademarks of the region\’s security organisations and secession groups. Developing a sustainable and inclusive securitisation strategy may be difficult but not impossible. Importantly, preventing losses to lives and livelihoods has become a key stability concern for the residents, government and development partners.

Unknotting the southeast\’s violence requires evidence and local engagement. Interventions in the region must be based on analysing the tracked information. It will provide insights to intervening actors on violence triggers, modus operandi of armed actors and seasons they occurred. This will also help identify and classify the violent actors. For example, there are arguments that beyond violent secession struggles in the region, other criminal elements, either secession group factions or independent actors, have capitalised on the uncertain security climate. Therefore, a robust analysis of the data from the region will provide the evidence for government and relevant actors to intervene and manage the worsening crisis.

A second approach is to increase stakeholders\’ engagement in the region. With available data, the government will be able to identify and distinguish self-rule agitators from other criminal organisations. This will help to inform combative and non-combative strategies to manage the violence. Also, local engagement should involve members of the police. In a report, the Nigerian police accused residents in Anambra state of withholding information about gunmen in the state. This suggests an imbalance in the securitisation of the state and region. To achieve sustainable peace, the people must buy into government\’s intervention strategies. The southeast\’s tales of terror calls for a holistic response strategy.

In 2022, Nigeria’s out-of-school children are estimated at 18.5 million, according to the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF). The figure is a sharp rise from 10.5 million recorded in 2021. According to UNICEF and other sources, Nigeria’s out-of-school children statistics are fuelled by northeast terrorism, banditry in the northwest and northcentral regions, incessant sit-at-home orders and attacks on non-compliant residents in the southeast. The continuity of these security challenges and their implications on safe schooling is telling. Beyond insecurity, other enabling factors are ethnoreligious limitations that constrain access to formal education.

Unsafe schools are one of the symptoms of violent conflicts in Nigeria. Many Nigerian schools are vulnerable to attacks by non-state armed groups. Education represents what the jihadist campaign is against in the northeast region, “western education”. Hence, the brazen attacks on schools, the abduction of school children, enslavement, forced marriages, recruitment and use as child soldiers. Schools face attacks in banditry-rampaged northwest and northcentral zones because the attackers have a large pool of potential kidnap victims they can use as bargaining chips for a ransom payment. Over 1,500 school students were kidnapped in 2021. In the southeast zone, attacks on schools are relatively less fatal. Reports show that attackers mainly disrupt school activities while enforcing sit-at-home orders. However, this trend and the broader violent conflict incidents in the region affect all aspects of human endeavour.

Nigerian children are one of the major losers in the era of increasing security threats. Attacks on schools limit access to education. According to UNICEF, one in every five of the world’s out-of-school children is from Nigeria. Sixty per cent of out-of-school children in Nigeria are girls. The country already has a poverty crisis, with about 83 million people living on less than $1.90. It is also argued that there is a poverty polarity, with figures from the northern region higher than the national average (Institute of Security Studies report). Continued constraints in accessing education will worsen the poverty statistics. The younger population are denied educational opportunities, which will affect their self-development, productivity, self-reliance and vulnerabilities. Given the proliferation of non-state armed groups, recruits are needed to fill up their rank and file. Hence, out-of-school, unskilled and unproductive demographics are vulnerable to the antics of violent entrepreneurs.

Nigeria must develop a new form of educational services. Education remains a critical tool for human capital development and the economic growth of a country. However, terror has increasingly made schools unsafe. Therefore, the Nigerian government must work with development partners to increase intervention programmes to provide basic education to conflict-affected children. In addition, delivering education in a crisis has become vital for the Nigerian government to ensure continued access to tutoring. For instance, curricular activities in displacement camps should be increased to ensure that displaced children can still access education. Interventions should also be made in host communities to strengthen the capacity of educational infrastructures and resources to meet the increased needs.

Education in crisis should include new roles for relevant actors. The uncertain crisis environment has increased the propensity for violence, killings, injuries and abductions. Therefore, communities, caregivers, teachers and other school management staff need to undergo security awareness and emergency preparedness training to identify and react to security threats. The training, which security experts will administer, should involve tactical strategies to evaluate and escalate security threats. It will help the relevant actors be vigilant to changes in their environment and work with security organisations to prevent attacks. This effort should involve community members where schools are located. Security should be marketed as a collective effort. Therefore, it will be essential to get the buy-in and collaboration of the communities in creating a new form of resilience and response to security threats.

Addressing violent conflicts in Nigeria will end the ripple effects. Unsafe schools and increasing out-of-school children significantly result from rising violent conflicts. The Nigerian government must increase combative and non-combative efforts to tackle escalating violence. Beyond education, violent conflict affects all aspects of human endeavours. Addressing the root causes of the various conflict issues in Nigeria will help prevent its implication on education and other socio-economic activities. Meaningful development cannot happen in the absence of peace and stability. Managing conflict in Nigeria will help the government and development partners’ effort toward development assistance across the nation. Unaddressed out-of-school children will create new problems for the country in future.

Nigeria\’s northeast region has faced extensive terrorist violence for over twelve years. Several communities in the region are home to terror attacks, degraded livelihood opportunities, basic services and a deepening humanitarian crisis. About 35,000 people have died from the ongoing crisis, and over 2.5 million people are displaced within the region and in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). The violence statistics may continue as several communities continue to face terrorist attacks. Many of the region\’s population are vulnerable to new attacks despite the counter-terrorism measures of the Nigerian government and her Lake Chad Basin neighbours.

Trailing the northeast\’s terrorist attacks are the displacement and humanitarian woes. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) seek refuge in displacement camps where basic services are luxurious, coupled with limited opportunities for livelihood and self-sufficiency. Others are found in host communities whose residents are often hostile, given that available resources cannot meet the needs of both groups. The situation often results in tensions between the displaced population and host communities over access to shrinking resources. Beyond communities that have been sacked by violence, other residents face the direct and indirect impact of the northeast violence. Humanitarian crises exist beyond displacement camps to include communities, where large populations struggle due to depleted livelihood sources, destroyed infrastructure, bodily harm, limited access to and availability of external support.

Women, girls and boys significantly populate refuge sites in Nigeria\’s conflict-impacted northeast and beyond it. These demographics\’ vulnerabilities are deepened by the continuance of terror, prolonged displacement periods and humanitarian crises. Besides, most violent conflicts affect women and girls differently. For instance, women and girls in the northeast are often kidnapped, sexually violated, forced into marriages or turned into suicide bombers. Young boys are victims of these challenges as their vulnerability predisposes them to the antics of jihadist groups. Furthermore, boys in this situation are also recruited by self-defence militias. In 2018, the United Nations Children\’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) reported that a local militia fighting Boko Haram insurgents released about 833 child soldiers in northeast Nigeria. According to UNICEF, the released children were among the nearly 1,500 boys and girls recruited by vigilante militias.

The Nigerian government and its development partners strive to assist the afflicted populations. Efforts are also made to return and resettle millions of the displaced population. The resettlement, therefore, includes empowerment schemes that will promote self-sufficiency. Beyond the focus on affected populations, the Nigerian government opened a window in 2016 for low-risk repentant insurgents to embrace its olive branches. The Nigerian military\’s Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) manages this programme as a counter-insurgency approach to deplete terrorist organisations in the northeast and broader Lake Chad Basin (LCB). However, reintegrating processed participants of the programme has proven difficult as many communities say they do not want them back.

The conflict in the northeast and its aftermath have depleted social cohesion. Multiple subsets of the population have been created as a result. Fostering social cohesion between the groups has been difficult for the Nigerian government. For instance, several intervention programmes in the region have a social cohesion component, given the subject matter\’s relevance to community resilience and stabilisation. Social cohesion is also relevant to preventing and managing internal conflicts such as the indigene-settler dichotomy, IDPs versus host communities, repentant insurgents and host communities. These scenarios require a more robust and all-inclusive engagement to salvage multidimensional challenges.

The Nigerian government, especially the Northeast Development Commission (NEDC) and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development, must encourage its development partners to support intrinsic community efforts geared towards resilience. The government should make more coordinated efforts at all levels to manage humanitarian interventions in the region. The federal government must drive efforts to synergise the roles of relevant stakeholders working in the conflict zone for sustained impact. Additionally, securitisation as a critical factor of stabilisation cannot be overemphasised. Government must strive to govern ungoverned spaces, securitise the violent hotbeds and prevent the infiltration or takeover of communities by insurgents.

In many parts of Nigeria, gunmen are raiding communities and leaving a trail of dead bodies, destroyed infrastructure and socio-economic activities. The Nigerian government\’s responses have come short of preventing further losses to lives and livelihoods. Indeed, new violent conflict theatres have emerged, while others have spread beyond regions. Banditry, broadly a northwest Nigerian security crisis, has filtered into parts of the northcentral. For example, non-state armed actors had hoisted their flag in a captured community a few kilometres from Abuja, the nation\’s capital and headquarters of almost all federal institutions, including security structures. The audacity appears limitless.

Down south, gunmen activities fatally target suspected government and security personnel. There are also the torching of public infrastructure and the ruthless enforcement of sit-at-home orders. Now known explicitly for these challenges, the southeast region has moved from relative normalcy to an uncertain security climate. The novel scene in the area has become the norm. The region\’s woes are further complicated by an age-long, and now, more resounding secession agitations, currently championed by the proscribed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Easily, security responses in the region appear as a direct lethal attack against self-determination groups, whose membership and sympathy arguably cut across varying demographics in the now-troubled area.

In the northeast, particularly in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, more than a dozen years of insurgency has created a new normal of frequent terror attacks, underlying socio-economic and humanitarian gaps. While efforts are made to secure the region and save its populace from continued anguish, there is no clear end to the ideological war nor the follow-up humanitarian emergencies. Continued gunmen attacks are still significant risks in many locations in the region.

As the proliferation of non-state armed actors continues, many affected Nigerians strive to match it with resilience. However, there is only as much as homegrown resilience can go without adequate external support in the face of the terror\’s pervasive and recurrent trajectory. For example, many residents in the southeast have adjusted socio-economic activities to align with the rebellious sit-at-home orders dished out by the IPOB. In northern Nigeria, communities are also developing novel approaches to cope with the realities of violent conflict. For example, a study by Nextier SPD in 2019 revealed some endogenous efforts communities in northeast Nigeria have developed to cope with the insurgency.

Despite the apparent resilient spirit of many Nigerians caught in the conflict, there are apparent gaps and complications. Understudied communities show limitations, especially with partial or no external support. Moreover, macro-level violent conflicts are engendering new social order, economic needs, and avenues for new fierce struggles. Therefore, communities impacted by violent conflict require government and development partners\’ support as they struggle to survive wars and rebuild their lives. For this reason, there is a need to increase funding opportunities to assess community resilience efforts in troubled communities. The assessment can help the government and development partners to understand homegrown efforts that can be supported and replicated in similar scenarios. It will also help identify practices that can exacerbate conflict and undermine the government\’s responses.

Furthermore, as implied earlier, resilience can complicate responses to violent conflict and humanitarian crises if not effectively managed. Already, the government\’s largely ineffectual securitising violent conflict flashpoints leads to the emergence of self-defence militias. Self-defence militias are largely ethnic-based, which may be new triggers for group conflicts that manifest as religious tensions and inter-communal wars over land and potential socio-political gains. Sprouting self-defence groups will complicate formal security responses if they are not managed. Therefore, Nigeria must first improve securitisation to discourage the need for local militias. Second, there is a need to regulate the activities of informal security networks that are purportedly providing policing functions and complementing formal security organisations. The creation of regional and state-level vigilante networks should mean that the pool of different vigilante actors is pulled as one organisation for a more effective and result-based management. On the one hand, it is the gunmen\’s menace. On the other hand, it is the resilience of Nigerians. However, proactive steps of the Nigerian government and its development partners will help foster a better outcome for the country.