Nextier SPD

Parts of northeast Nigeria are plagued by recurrent terrorist violence, notoriously perpetuated by Boko Haram and its 2016 splinter unit, the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP). Although in recent months, running into years, a now-formidable ISWAP has carried out most of the recorded terror incidents in the region. Twelve years ago, the northeast became Nigeria\’s most troubled zone, given the scale and frequency of armed attacks, the increasing number of displacements and humanitarian needs. About 350,000 people have been killed, 2.7 million persons displaced and 8.4 million more face humanitarian crises. Attacks in the region may have decreased, but the humanitarian realities are at high levels.

The emergence of other violent conflicts in Nigeria may have reduced media focus on the northeast\’s insurgency, but the region\’s woes are far from over. Analysis from the Nextier Violent Conflicts Database shows a steady yearly increase in the terrorism incident rate. In 2020, 56 incidents leading to 581 casualties (deaths and injuries) were recorded. The figure stood at 65 incidents resulting in 478 casualties. Between January 2022 and November 21, 2022, 92 violent cases and 795 deaths and injuries were recorded, according to the Database. The northeast zone may not be Nigeria\’s current major theatre of violence, but its residents are continually exposed to terror and overarching humanitarian needs.

Resilience in the northeast has existed alongside the recurrent terror, humanitarian crisis and multiple interventions. A study by Nextier in 2019 portrayed novel efforts of many northeast communities in managing the realities of the insurgency. New roles of women, youths, and traditional and religious organisations governing their communities, resolving conflicts and maintaining a semblance of security. Beyond these efforts, there are cases where local resilience succumbed to new terror threats or stiffer humanitarian conditions. Major charity and development organisations have also hinted at possible harmful resilience practices that may undermine efforts to stabilise the region. This possibility suggests the need to undertake a periodic investigation on emerging resilience mechanisms communities are adapting to survive the insurgency and see how they can be regulated and supported.

Beyond potentially harmful resilience mechanisms, stabilisation in these communities is threatened by neighbourhood effects of violence. In the northwest and northcentral Nigeria, armed banditry is rampaging several communities such that new reports claim bandits and northeast terrorists are collaborating. This suggests there is no end in sight to the terror in the northeast due to the ferocity of armed banditry and its spread across regions in Nigeria. Also, the Lake Chad Basin is dotted with violent conflict and climate change, with the two challenges reinforcing each other. Community resilience may be impacted by these external factors with or without humanitarian interventions.

There is a need for greater coordination in the northeast and the broader Lake Chad Basin (LCB). The Nigerian government should increase partnerships with donor agencies to propel the northeast region\’s development. The North East Development Commission (NEDC) must mobilise international support for the agency\’s mission. The initial aspect of the plan should be tailored in line with current counterinsurgency and counterterrorism measures in the area. Countering extreme ideologies through community engagement and content-specific messaging will help present counter-narratives to terrorists\’ antics. But investing in human capital will improve lives, provide better economic opportunities and empower people to be self-reliant. In addition, there is a need to pay attention to climate issues. The long decades of unaddressed drought, receding Lake Chad, and the lack of government presence are some key factors that birthed extremism in the insurgency. Therefore, there is a need to address the underlying ecological and demographic drivers of violent conflicts.

Nigeria has a displacement problem. Despite having about 2.7 million people already displaced in the insurgency-impacted northeast zone, thousands of people continue to make their way out of the nation\’s violent scenes and, more recently, flooded communities. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), about 8.4 million people in the northeast zone will require humanitarian assistance in 2022. As of October 17th, 2022, about 600 deaths and over 2,407 injured persons have been recorded in 22 states affected by flooding in Nigeria. The statistics include thousands of destroyed houses and farmlands in the affected states.

Since relative peace has not been restored in the conflict zones and the flooding crisis has not ended, millions of the victims face a humanitarian crisis. The victims of forced displacement in Nigeria often seek refuge in displacement camps and informal settlements characterised by harsh living conditions and often hostile host communities. The displacement problem has also birthed new sub-populations, including internally displaced people, refugees, host communities, and settlers. Humanitarian relief providers often struggle to cater to these groups\’ distinct needs. Hence, there is often significant consideration of conflict sensitivity and social inclusion in project and programme designs. This is because, due to shrinking resources and increasing needs, the struggle for survival is often keenly contested along newly created identities. Worse, the days of a return to normalcy are unclear, despite the government\’s ambitious plans to return and resettle the displaced population, especially in Borno state, arguably the worst hit of jihadist violence in the last twelve years.

In recent months, nowhere seems to be home for the displaced population lodging in displacement camps across Borno state government is reportedly shutting down displacement camps in the area. Reports claim that the Borno State government deems the shutdown necessary as part of their development plan to remove people from humanitarian assistance and to build their resilience to contribute to the state\’s growth. A report by Human Rights Watch holds that the government\’s action has displaced about 200,000 people. HRW also posits that the Borno State government was harming people already living in precarious conditions by shutting down IDP camps. According to the group, from May 2021 to August 2022, Borno State authorities compelled over 140,000 people to evacuate from eight camps in the state capital, Maiduguri. Also, the report noted that two other camps with a combined total of nearly 74,000 people are set to be closed later in 2022.

Where is home? Those compelled to leave the displacement camps are expected to make their return to rebuilt housing infrastructure by the state government. However, according to reports from the returning population, the houses have not been built. There is also a significant concern for alternative livelihood sources, security and collaboration with humanitarian organisations having to achieve their intervention schedules to match government\’s shutting down of displacement camps.

Like the rest of the world, Nigeria must first attend to the needs of its displaced population. Second, it must also address the triggers of displacement. The achievement of returning and resettling internally displaced persons will be more meaningful if the causes of displacement have been relatively addressed. The government must also ensure that the returning population are resettled in a secure environment where they can restart their lives. This will ensure they are not displaced again due to insecurity or internal crisis.

There is a need to conduct an assessment of the displaced population scheduled for return and resettlement. The independent assessment will gauge their resilience and self-sufficiency and help identify gaps that may pose challenges upon their return. Also, such an assessment can capture the state of the resettlement locations in terms of security and availability of infrastructure needed to ensure survival and propel the growth of the local economy. Finally, the return and resettlement of the displaced population must follow a multi-stakeholder and bottom-up approach to ensure adequate support and sustainability. It is possible for the displaced population to also resist resettlement due to several factors. However, this is where adequate sensitisation and stakeholder engagement can help government manage the process of return and resettlement. The travails of displacement and its triggers troubles millions of Nigerian IDPs; without strategic return and resettlement workplan, the challenges may remain, if not worsen.

In the last days of October 2022, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja, Nigeria\’s seat of power, was in a state of an unsettling security atmosphere. On the 23rd of October, a letter reportedly from the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria warning American citizens about \”elevated risks of terror attacks in Nigeria\”, especially in Abuja, went viral. Countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland and Australia followed suit with similar risk advisories about imminent terror attacks in Abuja. While reacting to the warnings, Nigeria\’s Minister of Information and Culture, Alhaji Lai Mohammed, reportedly asked Nigerians to be alert but not panic. However, the FCT Administration has barred vigilante groups from using firearms. Both reactions pose numerous security questions for the country.

In recent years, Nigeria\’s security crisis has witnessed an uptick in the spread of violence across the nation. Banditry in the northwest region is spreading to parts of the northcentral, while insurgency has continued in the northeast for over twelve years. Several reports indicate that jihadist terrorists in the northeast collude with bandits in the northwest and northcentral zones. In addition, the relatively peaceful southeast region has seen a rise in violent secession struggles and the menace of \’unknown gunmen\’. There are also episodic threats from militants in the Niger Delta and cases of gang wars,  highway violence, communal clashes and extra-judicial killings nationwide.

In all these, the Nigerian government has maintained optimism about Nigeria\’s security outlook. However, there are also times when government officials\’ comments contradicted available data and anecdotal accounts of violence victims in the violent hotspots. Other times, key public officials have encouraged residents to defend themselves against agents of terror, indicating the incapacity of the Nigerian state to protect lives and livelihoods. Therefore, the assurances of Alhaji Mohammed may not fly among Abuja residents.

Banning armed vigilante operations to manage the threats in Abuja is dicey. Vigilantism in Nigeria has surged due to the ubiquity of armed conflicts and apparent ineffectual securitisation. Several non-state armed groups have emerged in response to the gaps. While outfits such as Hisbah, Civilian Joint-Task Force (C-JTF), Amotekun, and  Ebubeagu have state backing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN) lacks state support being the armed wing of the proscribed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Also in existence are small-scale self-defence groups providing securitisation functions in different localities nationwide. In Abuja, many settlements and suburbs have vigilantes providing security services, especially at night.

Undoubtedly, banning vigilante outfits in Abuja may limit their operations\’ effectiveness since many of Nigeria\’s non-state armed groups (NSAGs) are sophistically armed. Hence, unarmed vigilante units will likely stand no combative chance. Nevertheless, the FCT Administration\’s position aligns with Nigeria\’s constitution, which prevents such quasi-security units from bearing arms. However, several, if not all, informal security units bear arms such as Dane guns, single-barrel rifles, machetes, clubs and other locally made weapons. Therefore, the perceived threat of vigilantism may be a regulation problem.

Given that vigilantism or informal securitisation has become a consistent feature of Nigeria\’s security framework, it is necessary to revamp its regulations. First, there is a need to invest in periodic capacity building of informal security units across the country. This will be a means to ensure their activities and modus operandi are in sync with formal securitisation protocols. It is also an opportunity to sensitise their operations to reduce cases of extra-judicial killings and other human rights abuses. The capacity building will also improve their effectiveness and partnership with formal security institutions such as the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the Nigeria Armed Forces and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). The vigilantism surge and conversations should culminate in a national regulatory framework.

Banning armed vigilantism in Abuja should mean greater commitments by Nigeria\’s formal security agencies. As argued above, unarmed vigilantes have lower chances of success against heavily armed criminals if they do not have immediate formal security agencies\’ support. Therefore, there is a need to deploy security personnel in vulnerable hotspots across the nation\’s capital beyond the timelines suggested by the warnings. Moreover, the analysis in Surrounded by Terror indicates that Abuja may not be immune to the terror recorded in other parts of the country. Generally, the rise of terror across the board should mean greater efforts to deploy effective strategies tailored to the specific crisis types.