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In the last days of October 2022, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja, Nigeria’s seat of power, was in a state of an unsettling security atmosphere. On the 23rd of October, a letter reportedly from the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria warning American citizens about “elevated risks of terror attacks in Nigeria”, especially in Abuja, went viral. Countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland and Australia followed suit with similar risk advisories about imminent terror attacks in Abuja. While reacting to the warnings, Nigeria’s Minister of Information and Culture, Alhaji Lai Mohammed, reportedly asked Nigerians to be alert but not panic. However, the FCT Administration has barred vigilante groups from using firearms. Both reactions pose numerous security questions for the country.

In recent years, Nigeria’s security crisis has witnessed an uptick in the spread of violence across the nation. Banditry in the northwest region is spreading to parts of the northcentral, while insurgency has continued in the northeast for over twelve years. Several reports indicate that jihadist terrorists in the northeast collude with bandits in the northwest and northcentral zones. In addition, the relatively peaceful southeast region has seen a rise in violent secession struggles and the menace of ‘unknown gunmen’. There are also episodic threats from militants in the Niger Delta and cases of gang wars,  highway violence, communal clashes and extra-judicial killings nationwide.

In all these, the Nigerian government has maintained optimism about Nigeria’s security outlook. However, there are also times when government officials’ comments contradicted available data and anecdotal accounts of violence victims in the violent hotspots. Other times, key public officials have encouraged residents to defend themselves against agents of terror, indicating the incapacity of the Nigerian state to protect lives and livelihoods. Therefore, the assurances of Alhaji Mohammed may not fly among Abuja residents.

Banning armed vigilante operations to manage the threats in Abuja is dicey. Vigilantism in Nigeria has surged due to the ubiquity of armed conflicts and apparent ineffectual securitisation. Several non-state armed groups have emerged in response to the gaps. While outfits such as Hisbah, Civilian Joint-Task Force (C-JTF), Amotekun, and  Ebubeagu have state backing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN) lacks state support being the armed wing of the proscribed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Also in existence are small-scale self-defence groups providing securitisation functions in different localities nationwide. In Abuja, many settlements and suburbs have vigilantes providing security services, especially at night.

Undoubtedly, banning vigilante outfits in Abuja may limit their operations’ effectiveness since many of Nigeria’s non-state armed groups (NSAGs) are sophistically armed. Hence, unarmed vigilante units will likely stand no combative chance. Nevertheless, the FCT Administration’s position aligns with Nigeria’s constitution, which prevents such quasi-security units from bearing arms. However, several, if not all, informal security units bear arms such as Dane guns, single-barrel rifles, machetes, clubs and other locally made weapons. Therefore, the perceived threat of vigilantism may be a regulation problem.

Given that vigilantism or informal securitisation has become a consistent feature of Nigeria’s security framework, it is necessary to revamp its regulations. First, there is a need to invest in periodic capacity building of informal security units across the country. This will be a means to ensure their activities and modus operandi are in sync with formal securitisation protocols. It is also an opportunity to sensitise their operations to reduce cases of extra-judicial killings and other human rights abuses. The capacity building will also improve their effectiveness and partnership with formal security institutions such as the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the Nigeria Armed Forces and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). The vigilantism surge and conversations should culminate in a national regulatory framework.

Banning armed vigilantism in Abuja should mean greater commitments by Nigeria’s formal security agencies. As argued above, unarmed vigilantes have lower chances of success against heavily armed criminals if they do not have immediate formal security agencies’ support. Therefore, there is a need to deploy security personnel in vulnerable hotspots across the nation’s capital beyond the timelines suggested by the warnings. Moreover, the analysis in Surrounded by Terror indicates that Abuja may not be immune to the terror recorded in other parts of the country. Generally, the rise of terror across the board should mean greater efforts to deploy effective strategies tailored to the specific crisis types.

Political activities in Nigeria are in top gear six months before the 2023 general elections. Beyond the politicking and projections, the polity is heating up with zealous online and offline debates among different supporters of the political blocs. Many people view the 2023 polls as a “make or mar moment” for Nigeria’s troubled stability and development. However, early violent clashes appear to suggest a repeat of history regarding ‘fiercely contested’ Nigerian elections. Recently, supporters of the ruling All Progressive Congress (APC) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) clashed in Zamfara state, an area troubled by recurrent armed banditry. The clash left one person dead and 18 others injured. On 17th October 2022, PDP members decried that suspected thugs disrupted their campaign train.

Nigeria has a history of electoral violence, and the upcoming elections may not be different. First, the three major contenders for the presidential slot represent Nigeria’s three dominant ethnic groups. Elections in Nigeria are keenly contested along identity fault lines such as religion, ethnic group and sometimes, geopolitical zones. The build-up of tensions and identity reflections may trigger violent conflicts along these fault lines. Second, Nigeria has many violent conflict hotbeds, so informal security provisions are increasing across the board. In the past, formal security organisations were accused of being partisan and perpetuating electoral violence. The tendencies of partisan securitisation may be higher with the spread of poorly regulated, undertrained and often identity-based informal security groups. Third, the conflict situation may be used as an excuse to overly securitise the polls and stifle political activities. For instance, the Zamfara State Government issued an executive order barring campaigning activities due to insecurity.

Recent incidents of political violence put a question on peace accords before the election. Peace accords have been signed at national and state levels, especially among contenders for the presidential and governorship positions. There have also been instances where the political aspirants met and maintained cordiality and displayed the spirit of sportsmanship. However, how will the symbolic events and encounters cascade to attitudinal change among the various political followers and supporters’ groups? Peace accords do not necessarily translate to peaceful political engagements if followers of political contenders and blocs do not subscribe to them or show signs of commitment. The latter is much more difficult, considering political support is fluid, if not fleeting. Therefore, commitment to peaceful political engagement may change when electoral interest, choice and situation change. Equally, it is arguably impossible to hold every electorate accountable.

Indeed, a peace accord is arguably a misrepresentation of reality if cordiality is only maintained at the aspirants’ level without trickling down to the supporters’ groups and other affiliations, including those with ethnoreligious leanings. At best, it is a projection of what should be rather than what is. Furthermore, political aspirants may not be held liable for the conduct of their supposed followers, especially if there is no evidence of direct or indirect instigation of violence. However, many political contenders, especially those engaging nationally, often raise group sentiments to garner more support. But this trend can trigger more than support. It can heighten group consciousness leading to fierce group struggles based on pre-existing conditions of violent conflict. Managing the tensions and possibility of violence must begin with a multi-stakeholder commitment to peaceful polls.

There is a need for political aspirants and parties to continue conversations of peaceful engagement. This is based on the premise that political aspirants will stay committed to the various peace accords signed. The conversations on peaceful engagements should be supported by Nigeria’s development partners and civil society organisations, who will provide capacity training, sensitisation workshops and campaigns targeted at political parties, support groups and other stakeholders involved in the electioneering activities. The essence is to cascade the elements of the peace accord down to individual supporters. Although total success may be unlikely, the engagements will help water down the disposition to non-peaceful means during the election cycle.

Nigeria’s security organisations must maintain non-partisanship in the 2023 general elections. Ongoing violent conflicts are already stretching their technical and resource limits, and further breakdown of law and order will worsen the nation’s security framework. Security organisations’ responsibility to the election should also include regulation of informal security units that may be used as political weapons. While relevant Nigerian agencies should prepare for hitch-free 2023 polls, the government should live up to its statutory obligation to protect people and their properties. Managing the current wave of terror in the country. A real-time conceptualisation and analysis of current security dynamics in the hotspots will help map out effective security measures that can manage the propensity of violence and prevent losses to lives and livelihoods. Beyond the elections, the government must save lives and properties from further losses.

Stability within Nigeria’s election window lies on most stakeholders, from the aspirants down to the electorates, committing to peaceful engagements. Nigeria’s diversity and current security challenges should also be considered in the political discourses and activities. Peaceful polls are largely guaranteed by responsible and transparent engagement from all stakeholders.

In recent years, the southeast has been characterised by violent self-rule agitations currently championed by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Several violent incidents recorded in the region have been linked to IPOB by Nigerian security agencies. However, the group have vehemently denied those claims. Also, sit-at-home orders, a feature of the IPOB’s agitation style, have received widespread compliance in the region given that the enforcers have attacked some defaulters and government forces did not effectively protect lives and livelihoods on designated sit-at-home days. Other reasons for the region’s stay-at-home compliance may point to perceived sentiments for the group and its quest for emancipation and a sovereign Biafran state.

The arrest and consequent prosecution of IPOB’s leader, Nnamdi Kanu, did little to calm tensions in the region. On the contrary, the court trial of Mr Kanu brought a fresh wave of agitations with the sit-at-home orders extended beyond election days to include his court appearance days, IPOB designated memorable events and other times, for some ‘arbitrary reasons’. A few years earlier, IPOB’s activities were arguably less non-combative until the creation of its armed wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN). ESN was purportedly created to protect Igbo lives and properties, predominantly in the old eastern region. Its creation sped up the establishment of the Ebubeagu, a southeast regional informal security network. However, it also led to repressive efforts from the Nigerian government, in which the Presidency holds an indissolubility stance on the nation’s unity. As a result, recurrent reports from the region include combative operations, anecdotal accounts of extra-judicial killings, assassinations, kidnapping, attacks on security formations and other government establishments, accusations of human rights abuses, court appearances, and discourses on the marginalisation and secession question.

The discharge of Nnamdi Kanu by Nigeria’s Court of Appeal on October 13th, 2022, may suggest a dousing of the region’s tensions. However, such hopes may be premature. Before Kanu’s arrest, clashes between IPOB and the Nigerian forces had gone violent, with the Nigerian military’s reported attack on Kanu’s country home in 2017. There were also other violent incidents between separatists and security forces in the region. This incident at Kanu’s country home has been argued as his reason for jumping bail. Kanu’s arrest on June 27th 2021, did not stifle the IPOB’s activities as hinted earlier; instead, a new wave of violent struggles rocked the relatively peaceful southeast region. According to the Nextier Violent Conflict Database, 291 incidents leading to 528 deaths have been recorded in the southeast between June 27th, 2021 and September 30th, 2022. Some recorded incidents have been directly linked to IPOB, mainly by Nigerian security organisations. Some Nextier articles suggest that IPOB may have lost grip of its members and sympathisers, given that sit-at-home orders and enforcements have continued despite IPOB cancelling some of them. There are several instances where IPOB have reportedly denied involvement in the violent attacks or their indictment by Nigeria’s security organisations. Also, other criminal networks may have taken advantage of the southeast’s uncertain security atmosphere and the police-versus-IPOB blame game to carry out heinous activities in the region.

Despite the gloomy possibilities, Kanu’s discharge has positive takeaways and potential. First, it gives a sense of free and fair trial, as recommended by a Nextier article as a non-combative means of dousing violent tensions in the southeast. Second, it may push IPOB members to soft-pedal on ‘aggressive’ approaches to protest Kanu’s trial and their pursuit of self-determination. Third, it may motivate IPOB to be open for dialogue should the federal government show willingness to non-conflict interventions. Fourth, a reduction in tensions, ‘lesser’ sit-at-home days and jubilations on Kanu’s release will likely prevent more fatalities, help achieve relative stability in the region and address the socio-economic implications of the stay-at-home announcements. But, first, the Nigerian government and other relevant regional stakeholders must deploy some measures.

Addressing the southeast’s violence requires evidence and local engagement. Interventions in the region must be based on analysing the tracked incident information. It will provide insights for intervening actors on violence triggers, the modus operandi of armed actors and periods of attacks. This will also help identify and classify the violent actors. As mentioned in the preceding, other criminal elements, either secession group factions or independent actors, are likely capitalising on the uncertain security climate in the region. Therefore, a robust analysis of the data from the area will provide evidence for the government and relevant actors to intervene and manage the crisis. Reliable data and local intelligence will guide combative responses and ensure they do not complicate the security situation.

There is a need to commit more to non-conflict intervention approaches in addressing the region’s issues. As recommended in Nextier Policy Weekly, there is an urgent need to have separate dialogues with the two critical actors–the IPOB and the Federal Government–involved in the conflict. The dialogue should yield two critical outcomes which must take place to mark the beginning of the restorative process. The idea of dialogue is to discourage resorting to violence and encourage communicative engagement to document and address the region’s multi-layered issues.

Nigeria’s Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, is gaining notoriety for violence. Despite Nigeria’s economic and geographical strength, Abuja is not among Africa’s top ten (10) safest capital cities. The once peaceful seat of power increasingly records killings, abductions, and mob attacks. According to a report, two persons were killed, and 22 others were abducted in Rafin Daji, a farming community in Abaji Area Council, Abuja. On June 20, 2022, residents woke up to discover the dismembered body of a young lady under a bridge in the Kubwa area of Abuja. The report suggests a case of ritual killing.

The deteriorating situation in Abuja may be linked to several factors. First is the instability ravaging all parts of the country. For example, some states in the northcentral and northwest regions, Nigeria’s most violent areas, share borders with the capital city. States like Plateau, Nasarawa, and Niger are volatile and susceptible to militia attacks and clashes between pastoralists and farmers. Data from the Nextier Violent Conflict Database shows that between January 2021 and May 2022, the northcentral region recorded 402 violent incidents, with 1,981 deaths and 962 kidnap victims. Several other regions of the country face various security challenges. These security issues, especially in rural locations, force dwellers to flee violent scenes.

The population explosion caused by people fleeing insecure states contributes significantly to the insecurity. Thousands of stranded squatters occupy abandoned houses and public and private spaces in the city and slums, increasing risky roadside trading, begging, hawking, and trafficking. Left with no choice, the Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB) has centred its core task around riding the streets of traders through undue harassment and brutality, an act that may influence individuals to engage in violent activities. In reality, urbanisation is a worldwide phenomenon. However, the unholy blend of urbanisation, unemployment and poverty may propel the heightened insecurity. Currently, 33 per cent of Nigerians are unemployed, and 91 million people live below the poverty line.

The Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) has blamed the rising insecurity on the distortion of the Abuja Master Plan. For instance, on July 5 2021, the FCTA demolished over 400 illegal structures in Lugbe, a residential district along the Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport, Abuja. Most of the illegal structures were identified as a haven for criminals. The Chairman, FCT Ministerial Committee on City Sanitation, Ikharo Attah, during the operation, noted that the effort was in a bid to strengthen security in the nation’s capital.

In 2019, the Federal Capital Territory police command introduced a policing plan. According to the then Police Commissioner, Bala Ciroma, the plan was created after extensive consultations with community leaders, stakeholders, and sister security organisations. The strategy aims to combat five crimes of particular concern: drug abuse, burglaries and theft, armed robberies, car theft, and cultism.

Yet, the activities of criminals have continued unabated. Indeed, the government cannot absolve itself from the declining security in the FCT and the country at large. Recent developments indicate that security is for the highest bidder. According to a report, only 20 per cent of police officers are engaged in the core police duties; 80 per cent provide security for individuals, businesses and government officials.

The government must commit its efforts to creating jobs for the teeming population. The government must work with critical players to expand conversations about job creation for qualified and unskilled Nigerians. The National Employment Policy (NEP) of 2002, the National Action Plan on Employment Creation (NAPEC), the National Youth Policy (NYP) of 2009, as well as the National Policy on Education (NPE), should all be reviewed and put into action by the government.

The Abuja Master Plan, at conception, was designed to accommodate about 3.5 million people, but the city now has over 6.5 million inhabitants. Therefore, the government should review the Abuja Master plan to accommodate growing societal needs and security changes. The plan should accommodate all classes of society. Also, efforts must be made to install operational surveillance cameras and street lights and increase patrol teams around the city.

As the Nigerian state continues to fight internal wars, multiple vistas of violent conflict continue to emerge, requiring urgent and holistic responses. The security measures should include reclaiming armed groups’ strongholds and re-establishing the government’s presence in the ungoverned spaces. Safety and stability will help prevent the need to flee from violence and improve the livelihood of people in rural communities. Furthermore, the government should liberalise the private security sector under a strict regulatory framework. This approach will substitute thugs for responsible, trained security professionals and reduce the burden of VIP protection on the police.

In Africa, food insecurity is dire. The United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organisation report shows a forthcoming global shift of food insecurity towards Africa. According to the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), violent conflicts in Africa have impaired food systems and contributed to growing hunger since 2014. Food insecurity exposes millions to malnutrition and undernutrition. By 2030, Africa is predicted to have half the global total of undernourished people.

Food security crises is a clog to the wheel of stabilisation efforts in conflict zones and managing the harsh realities of people affected by violence and climate change. For instance, the shrinking Lake Chad and activities of non-state armed fighters are driving people, especially pastoralists from the LCB region southwards, where they violently compete with sedentary farmers over access to lands in Nigeria. The ensuing protracted farmer-herder conflicts further deepen food insecurity and complicate government’s capacity to manage the challenges. Food insecurity also limits access to healthier foods for physical and mental development. Data from the World Health Organisation (WHO) states that 37 per cent of the world’s stunted children live in Africa. With many of Nigeria’s food insecure population being children, those affected are more likely to suffer underdeveloped cognitive abilities. The same children are also at a disadvantage to be employed in high-paying jobs in the long run. Such a cycle deepens socio-economic challenges in crisis locations.

Food insecurity in Nigeria is largely linked to rising violent conflicts and climate change. The unmanaged conflict poses a challenge to millions of people, especially rural farmers who make up 70 per cent of Nigeria’s farming population and produces 90 per cent of the nation’s agricultural output. Security tensions have sacked farming communities, altered farming and food systems and hindered access to farmlands. On 28th November 2020, over 40 Zabarmari rice farmers were beheaded by Boko Haram insurgents.  In the same month, it was claimed that bandits levied farmers in Zamfara state before harvesting their crops. In July 2021, about 1000 hunters were recruited by the Borno state government to protect farmers in the state, who otherwise may be vulnerable to insurgents’ raids in their farmlands.

The first reaction to solve Nigeria’s food insecurity may be to increase agricultural production. However, it is not a walk in the park considering rising violence and unmanaged climate action. For these reasons, efforts must be channelled towards tackling the proliferation of non-state armed groups that pose severe threats to farming communities and livelihoods. Other measures include genuine conversations to solve the farmer-herder conflict in Nigeria and tailored efforts to manage push factors of migration in the Lake Chad Basin. Conflict issues in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin contributes to 54 per cent of the food crisis in Africa, according to a 2020 analysis by the World Food Programme (WFP).

The intensification of securitisation efforts, including the Multi-national Joint Task Force’s efficiency, will help address security threats that hinder farmers from accessing farmlands and alter farming and food systems. Agricultural reforms appear to be happening at the same time with attacks on farmers and farming communities. However, without securing farming communities, the goals of agro-economic reforms may be unachievable. In exploring options to end food insecurity, the government must liaise with donor agencies, community actors and security operatives to arrest security threats to agricultural activities. Communities are more inclined to work with government institutions if they feel safe and their sources of livelihood are secured.

Hence, while government continue to brainstorm and implement a range of agricultural reforms, it is also essential to focus on stabilising target communities. As current efforts are being made to return and resettle Nigeria’s displaced population, promoting food security through secured farming communities is one way of stabilising communities whose members are predominantly farmers. In addition, conditional cash transfer to the “poorest of the poor” can be improved to include food vouchers. The essence is to create access to basic food items that are highly nutritious and may not be generally affordable for Nigeria’s poor population.

Farming communities are caught in the triangle of conflict, climate change and ineffectual policies. Thus, government and development partners must increase intervention efforts geared towards food security and the attendant nutritional and developmental challenges. As agricultural production has become tied to safety, such intervention efforts must have a security component to promote safe farming for community members. It should also include funding to promote access to nutritional foods, especially for millions of Nigerians caught in the web of conflict, displacement and humanitarian crises. Tailored intervention efforts are needed to manage the triggers of food insecurity in Nigeria and its consequences.

Across Africa, conflict, natural disasters and socio-economic challenges are triggering the transnational movement of people. As a result, millions of Africans seek refuge and livelihood opportunities in new abodes, where basic survival requirements are limited. In 2017, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) stated that over 19 million Africans were living in another African country against the 15 million recorded in 2015. The Institute of Security Studies (ISS) link migration in Africa to climate disasters, conflict and underdevelopment. Continued displacement within Africa will increase competition over shrinking resources, limit access to basic services, and engender social instability.

The phenomenon is anything but different in Nigeria and the broader Lake Chad Basin (LCB). About 3.2 million people seek refuge within Nigeria and the LCB due to climate crisis and years of conflict, particularly in northeast Nigeria. In the northwest, displacement figures are increasing due to unending banditry, farmer-herder clashes and other conflict issues. Millions of refuge seekers dwell in overburdened camps within and outside Nigeria, where basic human decency is a luxury. The cycle of displacement continues with largely unmanaged climate impact and cascading security challenges.

Largely triggered by conflict, the displaced population face new wars against hunger and other humanitarian challenges. As a result, food insecurity exposes millions to malnutrition and undernutrition. Moreover, the humanitarian needs increase the population’s susceptibility to criminality and violent competition with host communities. By 2030, Africa will have half the global total of undernourished people. Data from the World Health Organisation (WHO) states that 37 per cent of the world’s stunted children live in Africa. The latest prediction is that nearly 17 million Nigerians will be at crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity in 2022.

Climate impact, wars, humanitarian challenges are hurdles to the survival and development of millions of people in Nigeria and the LCB. Due to geographical proximity and similar national indices, Nigeria and its neighbours share conflict and climate change consequences. A clear example is a spillover of the jihadist insurgency from Nigeria to Chad, Cameroon and Niger. It is also portrayed in the movement of the displaced population from Nigeria to the LCB countries. Ending these issues means addressing them from a national and transnational standpoint. From the preceding, Nigeria and the LCB countries are connected by conflict, as exemplified by continued migration, spillover conflict, similar security challenges and development deficits.

On a national level, Nigeria must constantly update its national security framework and responses to meet the country’s current security threats. Old conflicts and new battles are posing significant threats to human security, livelihood, such that dozens of communities are forced to move away from their ancestral homes, with abandoned livelihoods and properties with economic value. Improved security responses, especially in the violent hotspots, will reduce the vulnerability of rural residents to harm, deepened socio-economic issues and forced migration.

Managing the consequences of conflict must mean adequate humanitarian responses. About 10.6 million Nigerians need urgent humanitarian assistance. The United Nations and partner organisations aim to provide life-saving assistance to 7.8 million of the most vulnerable people. This means that more resources are still needed to manage the humanitarian crisis. Worse off, violent conflict is triggering new displacements. Hence, the Nigerian government have a hard task of managing the increasing statistics of people in need. There is a need to tackle displacement and humanitarian issues from a conflict prevention approach. As mentioned above, improving security will reduce security threats.

Moreover, implementing early warning mechanisms and peacebuilding approaches will help manage the emerging conflict vistas. For example, communicative engagement for secessionist agitators in southern Nigeria have been recommended as an alternative to achieve peace without guns. In addition, the government’s support and collaboration with development partners and civil society organisations will help manage tensions that can snowball into violent conflict.

At the international realm, the LCB countries must commit to regional responses to insecurity, climate impact on Lake Chad. The Multinational Joint Task Force, as a transnational combative response to terrorism in the LCB, must continue to wage counter-terrorism warfare against insurgents. On the policy side, the independent national governments must commit to national policies that will promote development, address group marginalisation, justice issues and identity rivalries. Collaboratively, the LCB countries must call on the international community’s support to manage the climate-impacted Lake Chad and its effects on the local population. From underdevelopment to violent conflicts to displacement and humanitarian crisis, fundamental issues in the LCB are intertwined, requiring serious and collaborative efforts to manage.