NextierSPD

Arguably, being armed distinguishes armed groups from other types of actors in most political systems. Actors in Nigeria’s violent conflict scenes are increasing, and so is their need for guns. Across the country, multiple hotbeds of violence exist such that the nation’s security framework appears ineffectual in managing the scale and frequency of incidents. Notable cases include the twelve years of jihadist insurgency, evolving banditry,  civil unrest, violent secession struggles, gang wars, kidnapping, inter-communal conflicts, and farmer-herder crises. The Nextier Violent Conflict Database recorded 1,185 incidents leading to 4,192 deaths in the first eight months of 2022.

Increasing violence and its propensity is pushing conversations on self-defence, gun access, and informal security provisions. Many rural communities, highways and ‘ungoverned’ spaces lay vulnerable to non-state armed groups (NSAGs). The violence trajectory has brought about self-defence militias, investments in vigilanteism, and regional security frameworks such as civilian joint task force (CJTF), Amotekun and Ebubeagu in the northeast, southwest and southeast zones, respectively. In the northwest, on June 2022, the Zamfara state government encouraged residents to bear arms and defend themselves against bandits. Also, the Eastern Security Network, the armed unit of the proscribed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), was purportedly set up to protect Igbo lives and the Southeast region from insecurity, especially activities of pastoralists.

State governments in Nigeria appear to be major subscribers of informal security provisioning. Several states are setting up vigilante units and pushing for them to be armed. However, it appears the federal government is unclear on arms procurement for state security outfits. In Ondo state, Governor Akeredolu claims the federal government is showing double standards by allowing the Katsina state security outfit to bear arms and denying the Amotekun of same rights means “we are pursuing one country, two systems.” The emergence of informal security providers means the demand for guns and, possibly, an increase in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

New concerns for the Nigerian state are to review the evolving security dynamics in the country and the responses so far. It is also at the stage that evidence should inform the next steps in determining the security gaps, challenges of the security organisations, and triggers of armed conflicts across Nigeria. Essentially, there is a need to conduct a holistic evaluation of Nigeria’s security crisis. The evaluation will provide evidence for sustainable solutions.

The emergence of informal security provisions in a deeply divided country may become dangerous. Since violence often takes identity dimensions, informal security actors may become agents of group violence, especially if they are armed, undertrained and poorly regulated. There is a need for informal security units to be regulated in line with conflict and cultural sensitivities in the target areas. Informal security units must hinge on the assumption that such platforms’ idea is to securitise communities and not pique entities against entities. Nigeria’s security crisis is far from checkmated, so informal security actors may continue to increase. Therefore, the creation of supposedly supportive quasi-security units must be preceded by adequate awareness training to enhance the operatives’ knowledge of working in conflict zones.

Given the rise of violence and informal security provisions, the Federal Government of Nigeria must take a clear stand on arming such quasi-security units. There is a need to develop a holistic framework for operationalising informal security units such as vigilantes, Amotekun, Ebubeagu, and others. The holistic framework should be flexible and adaptive to the security realities in the intervention areas. This effort will help to curtail perceptions of federal government bias in responding to violent threats in Nigeria.

Conversations on informal security provisions indicate that existing structures are ineffectual in protecting lives and livelihoods. It also suggests a crisis of confidence if residents do not believe that government can protect them; hence, some people may prefer to be in charge of their safety by pushing for gun access and self-defence militias. This trajectory will breed a disconnect between the public and security organisations. Therefore, as an immediate response, the Nigerian government must be willing to hold conversations on revamping Nigeria’s security framework to match the current dynamics of insecurity in the country.

Armed conflicts have become the norm in many of Nigeria’s ungoverned spaces. Ungoverned spaces in Nigeria often refer to locations unreached by the government, hence becoming vulnerable to non-state armed groups (NSAGs). Some experts claim the spread of terror across Nigeria results from limited governance structures in rural locations. In Nigeria, ungoverned spaces and porous borders create havens for marauding non-state armed groups. While the Nigerian government strive to contain security threats, they tend to spread in scale and frequency, intensifying security needs across the nation.

Ungoverned spaces create largely unfettered opportunities for NSAGs to market themselves and undermine government authority. For instance, in 2021, some communities in Niger state negotiated peace deals with insurgents by offering them motorcycles and cash gifts in return for safety. In other cases, terrorists provide makeshift governance frameworks in some communities, imposing taxes and levies and ensuring fragile peace. The unaddressed nature of Nigeria’s ungoverned spaces is a breeding ground for underdevelopment and the spread of non-state armed actors. It also engenders a disconnect between residents in the ungoverned spaces and the government. Due to ungoverned spaces, government’s authority is weakened by the rise and dominance of non-state armed groups who provide an agenda-driven ideology that is often at variance with that of the Nigerian state. The northeast insurgency and banditry in the northwest and northcentral zones are clear cases.

Invariably, Nigeria’s ungoverned spaces can also stem from an uptick in armed conflict and government’s inability to manage violence triggers proactively. For example, the Niger Delta region was arguably a governed space until the exponential rise in violent militancy turned the region into a conflict theatre, reducing semblances of governance structures until an amnesty was extended to agitating militants in 2009. Currently, in southeast Nigeria,  the activities of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and unknown gunmen (UGM) are pushing many locations in the region into an ungoverned status. While formal and informal security arrangements strive to maintain stability in the region, many locations remain vulnerable to criminal gangs. Mondays are still observed as sit-at-home days in the southeast despite government encouraging people to go about their normal activities. Many residents are sympathetic to IPOB’s cause, afraid of disobeying their orders or do not trust security agencies to protect them on Mondays. Hence, the stay-at-orders meet widespread compliance on designated days.

Addressing Nigeria’s ungoverned spaces or preventing its spread must begin with proactive steps. Revitalising the local government administration as an autonomous tier of government is necessary for re-establishing government presence in ungoverned spaces. Unfortunately, many state governors in Nigeria have opted for transition committee chairpersons. Others conduct local government elections, reportedly marred by pre-selection and rigging. These practices are unsustainable and unhealthy for grassroots development and the building of the local economy. Ensuring the existence of local government authority as it has been conceptualised and constitutionalised will ensure a systematic process of grassroots governance, mobilisation and public accountability. It will also form the building blocks for political participation, citizen engagement and engendering public confidence in the government. Nigeria must treat the local government authority as an autonomous third tier of government rather than a political opportunity for state governments to practice their whims and caprices.

Focusing on traditional institutions in Nigeria will help revive local governance. Many Nigerian communities have traditional institutions that predate the Nigerian state. Therefore, it is necessary to identify and support such local structures and key into their local acceptance. International development actors are already identifying and supporting local actors as part of their conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in troubled communities in Nigeria. The Nigerian government should key into this initiative to support traditional institutions as the unofficial fourth tier of government. This will ensure a bottom-up approach to re-establishing government’s local presence and acceptance across the board. Technical and material support provided to traditional institutions will impact kinetic and non-kinetic interventions in conflict-impacted communities. As local stakeholders and potential change agents, traditional leaders will help to broker public trust and state-society security collaborations necessary for sustainable peace and stability.

Managing Nigeria’s porous borders will also help to govern ungoverned spaces and monitor cross-border movements effectively. Illegal borders undermine a nation’s effort to properly securitise its territory and regulate the flow of people, goods and services. Nigeria and some of her West African neighbours suffer from the porosity of their borders. For four decades after ratifying the Protocol on Free Movement for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and related Protocol on transhumance, it has contributed to the indirect promotion of non-state violence, according to a Nextier SPD publication. The Nigerian government must lead the call for a regional partnership for border security. The regional collaboration must prioritise efforts to close and monitor illegal entry points. Managing Nigeria’s ungoverned spaces require a holistic, bottom-up approach to provide governance frameworks in the affected locations.

In 2021, Nigeria lost at least $3.5 billion revenue to crude oil theft, a figure that represents 10 per cent of Nigeria’s foreign reserves. Oil theft and pipeline vandalism threaten oil exploration and accruable revenue. In 2019, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) announced that it lost ₦159 billion to oil theft and pipeline vandalisation. The losses were put at $2.8 billion in 2018. Although resources were appropriated to secure oil facilities, the activities of oil thieves continue unabated.

Oil theft also endangers communities. Oil theft combines with the consequences of oil exploration to deepen the challenges communities face. The Niger Delta, where Nigeria get most of its oil, is regarded as one of the most polluted places on the planet. Oil exploration poses varying degrees of health, environmental and development challenges for oil-producing communities. In January 2022, a petition calling for a probe into soot pollution and illegal refineries in Rivers state received at least nine thousand signatories. Over a month of an oil spill was finally shut in Nembe, Bayelsa state, in December 2021. A subsequent Senate resolution held that the leak spewed two million barrels of oil and gas equivalent into the Niger Delta creeks and mangrove swamps.

To solve oil theft, government should involve communities. The inclusion of host communities in pipeline protection and security contracts is argued to help government manage the threats to revenue sources. According to a report, 12 illegal oil storage sites were uncovered by a task force against illegal bunkering set up in Ikwere local government area in Rivers state. This incident confirms the gains of a combined formal security agencies-led and community involvement approach towards securitising oil facilities. The Ikwere model should be assessed to replicate it across the board. The securitisation of oil pipelines should be promoted as a collective responsibility.

Host communities’ involvement will create a sense of ownership and social inclusion. Oil-producing communities are challenged developmentally. Moreover, unemployment and the effects of oil exploration are dire on the population. The involvement of communities in protecting oil facilities will help create jobs and trigger a sense of ownership. That way, government and oil companies will be able to curtail the spate of oil theft through the local intelligence and support community members will provide to formal security actors. Additionally, it will provide avenues for wealth creation and reduce environmental issues in host communities.

Furthermore, the capacity of security organisations should be improved to manage the involvement of host communities. For instance, oil pipeline securitisation is yet to be fully embedded into the security architecture of Nigeria. The Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (Amendment) Act, 2007, empowers the NSDC to protect public infrastructures, including oil pipelines. However, it appears that there is a lack of collaboration and intelligence sharing among security agencies in securing public infrastructure. Therefore, with the NSDC taking centre stage, security outfits have to collaborate on securitisation strategies for oil facilities. This should also involve efforts to improve the synergy between security actors and communities where oil facilities are situated.

Beyond community-focused responses to oil theft, government must address widespread impoverishment in the region. Pipeline Hell Fires recommends that government should lessen the incidence of mass poverty by creating an enabling environment for small scale businesses. This will help create alternative sources of livelihood for people whose agricultural or fishing-based incomes have been affected by disastrous oil exploration activities. The jobs created from communities’ involvement in securitisation are another opportunity to disincentivise the operation of illegal oil bunkering, pipeline vandalism, and militancy. Losses to oil theft in Nigeria indicates the need for holistic review and engagements on issues around oil exploration, amnesty for Niger Delta ex-militants, and oil-producing communities’ development.

Nigeria shares in the security and socio-economic challenges around the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). From the shrinking lake to armed conflicts and the attendant humanitarian crisis in the region. The Boko Haram insurgency has also connected Nigeria with LCB countries such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Given porous borders and other inherent national challenges, the over twelve years of insurgency have become a regional burden. These factors, amongst others, increase neighbourhood effects on the LCB countries. Hence, many affected countries hardly struggle with security and socio-economic challenges in isolation.

The trio of Niger Republic, Cameroon and Chad are in the top twenty most fragile states in the world in 2022, alongside Nigeria. The fragility of these countries predisposes them to encounter local issues from their neighbours. In 2020, President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria held that only God could effectively supervise the borders between his country and the Niger Republic. Such considerations and the narrative of being the ‘giant of Africa’ perhaps moved Nigeria to procure vehicles to aid insecurity containment in the Niger Republic. Beyond security and socio-economic factors, Niger and some parts of Nigeria also share some socio-cultural affinity, especially in pastoral nomadism and religion. The realities between the two countries and other LCB countries mean that inherent local threats should pre-empt readiness from the countries.

State-level threats in West Africa pose concerns for the region. The flow of arms from Libya into the Niger Republic poses a high risk to other West African countries, especially those with internal armed hostilities. Research shows that the fall of Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 led to the arms flow down south. Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) across the region benefit from the movement of arms across borders, pushing violent group interests in many locations in the West African sub-region.

According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), countries in West Africa need to collaborate and stem the tide of weapons flowing from the Niger Republic. Porous border challenges between Nigeria and the Niger Republic increase the likelihood of arms flowing into Nigeria’s troubled violence hotbeds. Winning wars against NSAGs in one country without adequate measures from their neighbours indicates that weapons could move to the waiting arms of criminal networks in those countries where governments have not handled security effectively. ISS’s report affirms that a solution to Libya’s current crisis could increase arms trafficking in neighbouring countries as local demands decreases.

Instability in West Africa is a complex situation requiring isolated and coordinated strategies amongst national governments. Stability in one country could lead to armed actors and weapons movement to less stable neighbouring countries. Therefore, while combative responses are deployed across West Africa’s violent conflict scenes, they should be harmonised towards a holistic regional stability strategy. For instance, four decades after ratifying the Protocol on Free Movement for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and related Protocol on transhumance, it has contributed to the indirect promotion of non-state violence, according to a Nextier SPD publication. There is a need to amend the ECOWAS free movement protocol to meet the current security exigencies troubling the region. Like the Gulf of Guinea, where multi-pronged cooperation is argued as one of the causal factors for reduced piracy, transnational cooperation among the LCB towards porous borders and its discontents may address the issues. Additionally, transnational border management should be preceded by improved efforts by relevant agencies of the respective countries.

Armed groups may have capitalised on existing grievances, conflicts and social inequalities to unleash attacks on security forces and civilian populations. National governments of affected countries must solve inherent socio-economic and political inadequacies that may be fuelling the violent uprising by non-state armed groups and tendencies of violence spillover. Nigeria has witnessed similar trends with attacks on rural residents, herding groups and farming communities. New tensions are also emerging in southern Nigeria, with violent schisms between communities and herding groups, militants, and pro-secessionists versus the Nigerian state. These different dynamic security challenges trigger widespread instability and subsequent state fragility. Achieving stability in West Africa requires national strategies that feed into a holistic regional framework.

In 2019, the Federal Government of Nigeria alleged that some Nigerians were helping bandits to evade capture. In 2022, the wave may have shifted. Some traditional rulers now want them killed. The reasons may be simple. Banditry is a top security issue in Nigeria. About 2,334 people died in 935 events recorded in 2021, according to the Nextier SPD Violent Conflict Database. Communities in the northwest and northcentral Nigeria have seen the worst of the menace. In 2022, bandits, now officially classified as terrorists by the Nigerian government, are still attacking communities and leaving trails of bodies, blood and ruin behind. Therefore, it is unsurprising for some community stakeholders to ask for the elimination of bandits. However, that is not enough.

Community resistance against bandits must improve. Despite an Emir in Katsina state encouraging extrajudicial punishment for bandits, many residents in other flashpoints are still bandits’ enablers. In 2021, about 2,000 bandits’ informants were arrested in Zamfara state. More informants have been arrested in Sokoto and Niger states. Vigilantes killed about 11 more informants in Zamfara on 5th January 2022. In April 2019, the Federal Government bemoaned that some prominent personalities and traditional leaders in Zamfara state were aiding bandits to worsen insecurity in the state.

Government must push for more community buy-in. The connivance of some residents who serve as informants for bandits undermines security operations. Therefore, the Nigerian government should deploy measures to bring communities closer to the government, especially security agencies. In addition, awareness campaigns to gather support for the Nigerian forces combating bandits would help improve civil-military relations. From news reports, vested interests and other sentimental issues appear to be triggering violence in the region. Military efforts may seem like the best solution to the issue of banditry, but paying close attention to the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimensions of the conflict is equally important in building peace and stability in the area.

Beyond community buy-in, security and human capital development should also be prioritised in the flashpoints. Although community buy-in will help improve combative efforts through access to local intelligence, increasing development assistance for crisis-impacted communities will address the consequences of armed banditry on the population. In addition, the development intervention will help present a good image of the Nigerian state and equally set the pathway for state-community relations.