Bandits\’ Enablers

One of Nigeria’s most problematic armed groups, bandits, are defying local security partnerships. An ambush by bandits in Sakaba, Kebbi State, left at least 57 vigilantes dead on Monday, 7th March 2022. On the following Tuesday, 19 security personnel, including 13 soldiers, were killed in an assault in the same state. Ongoing security crises in Nigeria have led to the increasing relevance of local vigilantes to support formal security units. The most prominent arguments are that local vigilantes beyond providing personnel support, understand the territory and will eventually be a reliable source for local intelligence. In addition, more robust government efforts have been around creating regional security frameworks and periodic discussions on community policing. Nevertheless, despite these actions and inactions, Nigerian security actors face fatal attacks in violent flashpoints.

Nigerian security actors are struggling to end banditry. They are also struggling with their informants. Monday\’s attack resulted from an ambush by bandits, suggesting they had prior information of the vigilantes’ operation. In 2021, about 2,000 bandits’ informants were arrested in Zamfara state. More informants have been arrested in Sokoto and Niger states. Vigilantes killed about 11 more informants in Zamfara on 5th January 2022. In 2019, the Federal Government of Nigeria alleged that some Nigerians were helping bandits to evade capture. Several media reports have shown people in the bandits-affected areas supply resources such as fuel and other essentials to bandits. The Nigerian government appear to be fighting two wars: a lethal war with bandits and a conflict of interest with bandits’ informants and enablers.

Ending banditry, now classified as terrorism in Nigeria, must include greater kinetic and non-kinetic approaches. Unfortunately, there appears to be a disconnect with some residents who still support bandits despite the carnage they unleash. The Nigerian government must deploy the carrot and stick approach in managing the trend. First, the engagement of civil society actors to spread patriotism and security for all campaigns will help educate people against helping criminal networks. It will also drive local support for formal and informal security operatives. The Nigerian government should partner with development agencies and CSOs to create tailored messaging and community-level stakeholder engagement workshops to implement these sensitisation campaigns.

Government’s stick approach should involve increased policing in banditry-prone areas. The securitisation efforts should be able to monitor activities that provide logistics support to bandits. Furthermore, specific legislation and prosecutions will ensure bandits’ informants and enablers face justice. It will serve as a deterrence for future offenders. In Snitches Get Stitches, Nextier SPD argues that if the Nigerian state can discover the connivance of traditional rulers with bandits through military intelligence, such information should be acted upon to make arrests and ensure perpetrators face justice. The impact of intelligence is never complete until it leads to crime prevention and control. The Nigerian government should not be bemoaning from a seeming point of weakness but should make thorough investigations. The speculations that some local stakeholders are aiding banditry should result in arrests and prosecution.

Beyond security measures, human capital development should also be prioritised in the flashpoints. Although community buy-in will help improve combative efforts through access to local intelligence, increasing development assistance for crisis-impacted communities will address the consequences of armed banditry on the population. In addition, the development intervention will help present a good image of the Nigerian state and equally set the pathway for state-community relations.