Daily Analysis

The initial optimism accompanying Guinea’s transition to democratic rule after the 2021 coup that ousted President Alpha Condé has gradually fizzled out. Promising to restore constitutional order, the coup regime under the leadership of Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya has since become mired in a process that is extremely slow and increasingly dubious. In September 2021, Colonel Doumbouya and his military junta seized power in Guinea, overthrowing Condé, who had controversially extended his presidency for a third term. Initially, the coup was met with cautious optimism from citizens and international condemnation on the other. The military government promised a transition to civilian rule, which included drafting a new constitution, holding elections, and reforming state institutions. These commitments were intended to restore Guinea’s democratic framework, which had been eroded under Condé’s presidency.

ECOWAS and other international bodies called for an immediate return to democracy, initially proposing a six-month transition period- a timeline largely dismissed as unrealistic. Eventually, in 2022, the parties reached a compromise, agreeing on a 24-month transition period that should end by the end of 2024. However, the pace has been slow. The initial optimism surrounding the military’s promises has gradually shifted to scepticism, with growing doubts over the regime’s commitment to a genuine democratic transition.

One of the more ominous trends of the transition in the country has been the periodic delays in key reforms. While the junta has promised a new constitution, electoral reforms, and a census, little concrete progress in these respects has been realised thus far. In their place, many observers have remarked on the tendency of the government to entrench itself in power, a process stirring fears that the timeline for transition might be extended indefinitely. There is widespread unease that the new constitution could legitimise continued rule by Doumbouya rather than constitute a robust democratic framework. This has left the country’s political atmosphere polarised, with some perceptions that the junta is using the transition to retain power. Adding to the complications besetting Guinea’s transition is the relative silence of the international community. While ECOWAS and the African Union have expressed concerns over the pace of the transition, they largely avoided taking solid actions to hold the junta accountable. This lack of international pressure may have emboldened the coup regime to carry on with minimal interference.

Guinea’s transition is unfolding against the backdrop of a broader trend of the military coups that have recently beset West Africa, including Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. These countries have forged relationships with antidemocratic powers such as Russia and China, worsening efforts toward democratic governance in the region. Guinea’s military leadership has also signalled interest in deepening ties with these non-democratic states, raising concerns about the erosion of democratic norms across West Africa. This lagging transition beckons to question whether democratic principles are being sacrificed at the altar of geopolitics by the international community’s lukewarm response to events in Guinea. For example, the United States Institute of Peace points to the complete lack of engagement by the regime with democratic norms and the disturbing regional trend toward authoritarianism.

Guinea also faces critical tests in its internal political situation. The country is very divided along ethnic and political lines, and the military junta has struggled to encourage an inclusive political dialogue. Several opposition parties have been excluded from decision-making processes, while civic and media freedoms have been restricted significantly recently. Economically, Guinea faces severe challenges, from widespread poverty and unemployment to underdevelopment. In this regard, the junta has tried to implement some developmental projects, which have been fraught with hitches. Without substantial economic reforms, the prospects for a stable democratic transition appear bleak.

Despite the challenges, there remains hope that Guinea can eventually achieve a successful transition to democracy. However, for this to happen, several fundamental changes are necessary. First, the military government must commit to greater transparency and inclusivity in the transition process, particularly in drafting the new constitution and organising elections. Additionally, regional actors, like ECOWAS and the AU, as well as Western governments, need to be more actively engaged in closely monitoring the transition developments and holding the junta to account for delays and deviations from the agreed timeline. Ultimately, the democratic future of Guinea will depend on the readiness of both domestic and international actors to put democratic governance above short-term political or economic interests. The optimism accompanying the initial coup has ebbed. Yet, it is still possible for Guinea to emerge from this transition as a stable and democratic entity —if decisive action is taken on time.

Over the past decade, Africa has witnessed a technological boom. Countries like Nigeria have embraced e-commerce and other digital innovations, revolutionising how businesses operate and consumers access goods and services. Nigeria’s rapid technological advancement has made it  Africa’s most significant information and communication technology (ICT) market, accounting for approximately 82 per cent of the continent’s telecom subscribers and 29 per cent of internet usage. The continent’s robust technological advancement has set the stage for cross-country knowledge transfer, creating a fertile environment for cross-country knowledge transfer and collaboration.

Despite technological advancements’ benefits to Africa, there are growing concerns about their dark side.  The rise of cybercrimes, such as fraud, identity theft, and, more alarmingly, deepfakes, poses significant risks to the continent’s peace, stability, and democracy. Deepfakes are hyper-realistic images, videos, or audio recordings that are digitally manipulated to show someone doing or saying things that never happened. It relies on neural networks to analyse large data samples, learning to replicate individual voices, facial expressions, mannerisms, and inflexions.

Political instability remains Africa’s significant concern. The continent has experienced nine major military coups since 2020. Countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, which are all under military rule, are increasingly unstable, and there could be further coups in these countries. In 2023, Sub-Sahara Africa accounted for 48 per cent of the global deaths from terrorism. The emergence of deepfake technologies will likely fuel more instability on the continent. It has the potential to sow mistrust and confusion among citizens.

A notable example of the dangers deepfakes could pose occurred in Gabon in 2018. A video surfaced showing then-President Ali Bongo delivering his annual speech in a stiff and expressionless manner. There were allegations that the video may have been a deepfake, fuelling suspicions that the government might be hiding something.  Although it was never confirmed whether the video was manipulated, the damage was already done. Just a week later, the military attempted a coup, motivated in part by the belief that the video had been fabricated. While the coup was ultimately unsuccessful, it highlighted the role deepfake suspicions played in fuelling unrest.

Deepfake also threatens democratic countries in Africa. For example, during Nigeria’s 2023 election, voice recordings of the former presidential candidate of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Atiku Abubakar, his running mate, Ifeanyi Okowa, and former Sokoto governor, Aminu Tambuwal, circulated on social media. The recordings alleged that the three politicians were plotting to undermine the election, stirring up suspicion and unrest among voters. Although the politicians denied the authenticity of the audio, its circulation demonstrated the destabilising potential of deepfakes. Nigeria, already grappling with weak democratic institutions, corruption, and shrinking civil liberties, could see these challenges magnified as deepfakes increasingly blur the lines between reality and fabrication, potentially undermining trust in democratic processes.

In addition to threatening democracy, deepfakes can also empower criminal syndicates. In October 2023, cybercriminals used deep fake technology to impersonate the African Union (AU) Commission chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamad, creating realistic fake videos and recordings. The criminals set up video calls through these counterfeit videos and recordings and engaged with European leaders. This shows how dangerous deep fakes can be, as criminals and terrorist groups could use them to their advantage.

Raising public awareness is one of the key strategies to combat the harmful effects of deepfakes. According to a survey by KnowBe4, 74 per cent of respondents from countries such as Botswana, Egypt, Mauritius, South Africa, and Kenya were deceived by deepfakes, and 48 per cent of Africans surveyed did not know what deepfakes were. These statistics highlight the urgent need for education and awareness around the dangers of deepfakes. One approach is to integrate lessons on deepfakes and emerging technologies into school curricula across the continent. Additionally, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU could collaborate on broader initiatives to raise awareness of the risks posed by deepfakes.

However, the challenge with deepfake is the lack of appropriate measures to address the issue. In 2024, the AU in 2014 adopted the Malabo Convention, a legal framework to combat cybercrimes and protect personal data. Various African countries also have laws addressing cybercrimes, but these laws do not adequately address deepfakes. One way to combat the harmful effects of deepfakes is raising awareness. According to a survey by KnowBe4, 74 per cent of respondents from Botswana, Egypt, Mauritius, South Africa, and Kenya fell for deepfakes. The survey result showed that 48 per cent of Africans were unaware of deepfakes, highlighting the need for increased public education. This can be done by encouraging countries to incorporate the education of deepfakes and other technologies into school curricula. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU should work together to raise awareness of the dangers of deepfakes.

One major problem with the Malabo Convention is its ratification. Despite the potential scope of the convention, only 14 members out of 55 AU members signed it, and 13 members ratified it as of March 2022. The reasons for the slow ratification from AU members range from political reasons to the lengthy ratification process and the lack of awareness among policymakers on the importance of cybersecurity protection. Therefore, there is a need for members to not only ratify the convention but incorporate deepfake into it. Doing so would prepare the continent to confront this evolving threat with a legal framework that directly targets deepfake technology.

In addition, news and media outlets across Africa should partner with technology companies to develop strategies for training journalists in detecting deepfakes. By equipping journalists with the tools and skills needed to spot fake content, they can play a critical role in educating the public and fact-checking information before it spreads. AI-powered detection tools can also be employed to distinguish real media from manipulated content. As deepfake technology is relatively new and will become more sophisticated over time, it is essential for African countries to understand how deepfakes works. This understanding will help policymakers develop appropriate laws and regulations to address deepfakes and safeguard against their potentially destabilising effects on security.

Over the years, digital media has expanded, adding a new dimension to peacebuilding efforts. In particular, social media platforms have emerged as critical spaces for dialogue, activism, and promoting nonviolent conflict transformation. For instance, within Nigeria’s peace processes, social media has gradually assumed a central role, especially as conflicts increasingly shift from physical to online. Platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp are widely used to foster communication and facilitate dialogue across the country’s diverse communities.

Digital media platforms have enabled individuals from diverse ethnic, religious, and regional backgrounds to engage in discussions about shared experiences, grievances, and hope. This has made social media an indispensable tool in Nigeria’s peacebuilding landscape by facilitating real-time communication and mobilisation during violent conflict. For instance, social media has been instrumental in dispelling rumours that often deescalate violence. The immediacy of these platforms enhances the effectiveness of early conflict resolution efforts.

Other digital media applications, such as systems for early warnings, can help prevent violence. Monitoring social media platforms by peacebuilders and government agencies can identify the triggers for potential conflict, such as hate speech, inflammatory content, or circulation of provocative videos. This is already a promise the digital peacebuilding ecosystem of Nigeria has shown- driven by civil society organisations collaborating with technology companies. These actors have developed tools through which communities can report violent incidents, threats, or social unrest in real time. Such information allows security agencies or peacebuilding organisations to mount timely responses. Additionally, online monitoring platforms track online discourse to identify areas where intervention is needed, helping prevent conflicts before they escalate. However, while social media platforms offer great potential and opportunities for peace, they can also be used to amplify dangerous narratives.

One of Nigeria’s biggest challenges is the rapid spread of fake news and hate speech. In many instances, these fake stories have inflamed tensions and distrust, provoking violence between communities. In response, fact-checking initiatives and media literacy campaigns have been integrated into various digital peacebuilding strategies. Organisations like International Alert have underlined the need for public engagement, especially among young people, to develop the needed skills to identify and counter misinformation. These educational initiatives on responsible media consumption encourage individuals to verify information, helping mitigate false narratives’ harmful effects on conflict dynamics.

Youths, who comprise over 60 per cent of Nigeria’s population, are significant in fuelling and dousing conflict. An active social media presence implies they can also become important stakeholders in peacebuilding efforts. Therefore, digital peacebuilding can be an avenue to empower young Nigerians to use their voices to advocate for peace rather than violence. Youth-led movements promoting tolerance, empathy, and non-violence can harness social media campaigns that feature influencers and artists encouraging their followers to engage in peaceful dialogue and reject divisive rhetoric. Campaigns such as #EndSARS, which initially focused on police brutality, later metamorphosed into broader movements advocating for systemic reforms and peace. Young influencers played a significant role in mobilising these movements, demonstrating the immense power of digital media in shaping public opinion and driving social change. Through their platforms, they showcased how online activism can amplify calls for justice, reform, and nonviolent solutions to societal issues.

To fully harness the potential of digital peacebuilding, it is crucial for stakeholders to strike a delicate balance between implementing necessary regulations and ensuring that online spaces remain open, accessible, and inclusive for meaningful dialogue. On the one hand, regulation is essential to curb harmful content, prevent misinformation, and protect vulnerable groups from online harassment and abuse. However, overly restrictive policies could stifle freedom of expression, limit diverse perspectives, and inadvertently silence marginalised voices that are critical to fostering understanding and reconciliation. Ultimately, maintaining this equilibrium is essential for cultivating an environment where digital tools can be used to build peace, mediate conflicts, and promote social cohesion, all without compromising the fundamental principles of free expression, inclusivity, and diversity.

Even as progress is made in different directions, challenges persist that hinder the full implementation of digital media for peace in Nigeria. Issues such as misinformation, cyber harassment, and digital divides continue to pose obstacles. Also, the Nigerian government’s regulation of social media in 2021 raised concerns about free speech and access to information. To fully harness digital peacebuilding, it is crucial for stakeholders to strike a balance between necessary regulation and ensuring that online spaces remain open and inclusive for dialogue.

Going forward, there is a need for better coordination on the part of the government, civil society, and technology companies. This collaboration forms the foundation for scaling up digital peacebuilding initiatives, advancing digital literacy, and ensuring universal access to digital tools and platforms, especially for marginalised communities. Achieving this requires concerted effort and inclusivity from all sectors of Nigerian society, leveraging the immense potential of digital media to foster lasting peace. Digital media offers Nigeria an unparalleled opportunity to build peace within its greatly divided communities. Conflicts can be prevented by bridging digital divides and using platforms to promote dialogue, counter misinformation, engage youth, and support community-driven programmes. The full potential of digital media in peacebuilding will only be realised through collaboration across all sectors, with a shared commitment to using digital platforms responsibly and constructively.

Access to a healthy diet is invaluable. The prerequisite for sustainable development is a well-nourished and healthy workforce. A well-nourished population reflects how well a country’s social and economic sectors are performing, and to a greater extent, it shows the efficiency of allocating the country’s national resources. A country suffers the consequences when access to a healthy diet becomes limited. Nigeria struggles to meet the growing demand for healthy foods, which threatens economic development and prevents Nigerians from improving their standard of living.

Since February 2024, the Cost of a Healthy Diet (CoHD) has steadily risen. A report by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the Nigerian agency responsible for the development and management of official statistics, showed that the CoHD for July 2024 (₦1,265) was 35 per cent higher than it was in February 2024 (₦934). The CoHD for July 2024 was approximately 2 per cent higher than June 2024 (₦1,241). The key drivers behind the increase in the CoHD are the rising prices of legumes, vegetables, nuts, seeds, and starchy staples. There is a positive relationship between the CoHD and food inflation. Rotimi Fakeyejo, a financial and economic expert, stated, “The rising cost of healthy diets is directly related to food inflation, which has contributed to the overall increase in prices”. He further said, “It is food inflation that’s brought about the high cost of healthy diets, so they are directly related.” At the state level, Ekiti, Osun, and Ogun states’ CoHD were ₦1,632, ₦1,612, ₦1,611, which is higher than the national average CoHD (₦1,265). Moreover, Katsina, Adamawa, and Sokoto recorded the lowest cost with ₦884, ₦914, and ₦927. On the zonal level, the South-West zone has the highest average CoHD at ₦1,581 per day, followed by the South-South Zone ₦1,487 per day. The North-West zone recorded the lowest average CoHD with ₦956.

The rise of the average CoHD puts a financial strain on Nigerian households, primarily low-income households. Since the national average of CoHD is ₦1,265, this means that over a month (30 days), the total CoHD will be ₦37,950. This means that having one healthy meal daily for 30 days takes more than half (0.54 per cent) of the average minimum wage (₦70,000). Getting three healthy meals per day will cost ₦3,795. In a month, the total sum will be ₦113,850, 61.4 per cent more than the minimum wage. The high cost of a healthy meal has far-reaching consequences on the country’s economic development and the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Nigeria is already facing significant challenges in fighting poverty, and the high cost of healthy foods will worsen it. According to the World Bank, Nigeria’s poverty rate is estimated to have reached 38.9 per cent in 2023, with approximately 87 million Nigerians living below the poverty line. This makes Nigeria the world’s second-largest poor population after India. In line with the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goal 1 (SDG 1), Nigeria aims to eradicate poverty by 2030. The high cost of healthy foods makes it difficult for Nigeria to achieve SDG 1 in 2030 by diminishing the purchasing power of Nigerians, especially impoverished Nigerians, pushing more Nigerians into poverty.

The high cost of healthy diets will exacerbate child malnutrition and food insecurity in Nigeria, especially in the Borno, Adamawa, and Yola states (BAY states), which have been hit the hardest by insurgency. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in the BAY states, approximately 4.4 million people are expected to have either a crisis or emergency food needs in the lean season. UNOCHA further stated that in these states, about 1.53 million children under five years old are expected to face acute malnutrition and approximately 511,800 children are expected to face severe acute malnutrition (SAM), a life-threatening situation. This has profound implications for Nigeria’s economic growth and development. The high cost of healthy foods will worsen the malnutrition situation in Nigeria and lead to low economic productivity. Access to a healthy diet is essential for children because it helps with their education and improves the country’s human development index (HDI). As the proportion of educated workers increases, so does a country’s productivity. Through education, people develop the necessary literacy and critical thinking skills to solve complex societal problems. However, the high CoHD prevents Nigeria from improving its HDI through children’s education. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Nutritious Officer, Nkeiru Enwelum, children who are malnourished have reduced brain and physical comity development, making them unlikely to do well in school. This significantly reduces Nigeria’s HDI and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The inability to access nutritious foods will also affect people’s ability to afford medical care, leading to high mortality rates among the most vulnerable population.

The Nigerian government has taken measures to address the rising cost of a healthy diet. The government released maize, millet, and other agricultural produce from the nation’s food reserve to boost agricultural products. Other government initiatives include making fertilisers available to farmers and establishing agro-rangers to curb insecurity. Despite government efforts, the cost of healthy diets remains high in Nigeria. Insecurity, persistent socioeconomic vulnerabilities, and overreliance on food imports to feed a growing population contribute to food inflation and, in turn, the high cost of healthy diets.

Terrorist activities by bandits, insurgent groups and Fulani herders have made farmlands inaccessible. Many farmers have abandoned their farmlands due to insecurity. To tackle insecurity, the government and various stakeholders must be proactive. This will mean working with communities and utilising community policing as a practical measure against insecurity, especially in hotspot areas. Technology should be utilised to assess areas with hotspot areas and take swift action to protect farmers from violent attacks.

In Nigeria, there are persistent socioeconomic vulnerabilities, with 133 million people experiencing multidimensional poverty. Those who are vulnerable do not have the financial resources to afford a healthy diet, and the rising cost of nutritious diets will further limit their access to healthy foods. The federal, state, and local governments and various international and national bodies should identify the minimum-income households required to access diets, provide social protection and use cash transfers to aid vulnerable populations, especially in the BAY regions.

There needs to be a proactive approach towards revitalising the Nigerian food system. Effective collaboration between research institutions should be established to develop seed varieties, and smallholder farmers need to be educated about these innovations. The government should encourage public-private partnerships to drive agricultural innovation, facilitate technological advancement, and attract investment. This will help empower smallholder farmers and make Nigeria less dependent on food imports.

September 10, 2024, floods in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, Nigeria, have had devastating consequences, exacerbating already existing challenges in a region beleaguered by over a decade of insurgency and humanitarian crises. The areas affected were mainly Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC) and Jere Local Government Areas (LGAs). Heavy rainfall and structural failure from the Alau dam resulted in the dam breaching its banks overnight, causing the worst flood in 30 years. This catastrophe submerged over 70% of Maiduguri. Beyond the immediate destruction, the flood has far-reaching implications, from heightened insecurity to a deepening of the humanitarian crisis and extensive economic damage.

According to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), the flood killed 259 people and displaced 625,239. It has affected approximately one million people, damaging infrastructure and submerging the homes of many residents. This unfortunate event increases the vulnerability of residents in the affected areas. Access to many places is significantly restricted, affecting critical supply chains and disrupting access to schools, healthcare facilities, and markets. Many of the displaced have sought refuge in overcrowded Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, worsening already dire living conditions. Before the flood, nearly 4.8 million people in the region were already in dire need of humanitarian assistance due to the menace of the Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) insurgencies, making the situation even more precarious.

One of the flooding’s most immediate and alarming consequences is the mass jailbreak from Maiduguri’s central correctional facility. Over 200 inmates escaped when the prison was overrun by floodwaters, with many still at large. Reports indicate that among the escapees were individuals incarcerated for violent crimes, including members of Boko Haram and ISWA. Prisoners escaping due to the flood could potentially help strengthen Boko Haram’s ranks and aid them in regaining some lost territories.

The flood has had far-reaching consequences in other areas, disrupting power supply and businesses, causing clean water shortages and affecting telecommunication services. Another potential issue that can come from the flood is food shortages. According to the World Food Programme, Maiduguri is already facing a malnutrition crisis, with 4.4 million people lacking access to food. This flash flood could potentially drive up food-insecure people, worsening the food insecurity. Moreover, the economic impact extends beyond immediate losses. The long-term costs of rebuilding infrastructure, resettling displaced populations, and restoring public services will be immense. The federal government has already opened more IDP camps to accommodate the displaced, but the financial burden on local and national authorities will be substantial. The need for international support is critical, both for immediate relief efforts and for long-term reconstruction and development.

The flood has largely been attributed to government failures. Though there were early metrological warnings, early response was largely lacking. Also, the collapse of the Alau dam is not new. The dam was created in 1986 to help farmers with irrigation in Maiduguri. In many instances, the dam has helped control flooding; however, in 1994, heavy rainfall caused the dam to break and flood Maiduguri. The flood also affected Kebbi, Kaduna, Sokoto, Katsina, Kwara, Plateau and parts of Cameroon. In 2012, the dam broke and flooded nearby communities, claiming the lives of 363 people and displaced 3.8 million people. Similarly, the 2022 floods, caused by heavy rains and the release of excess water from the Lagdo dam, affected 29 States in Nigeria. According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society and NEMA, the 2022 flood affected more than 19,000 and displaced over 13,000 people. It killed 67 people from 100 communities in eight LGAs. The reoccurrence of the dam collapsing reflects the government’s failure to take long-term measures that will help prevent the dam from future collapse, which will likely continue to disproportionately affect people who have been displaced or are facing mobility restrictions.

As a response to the flood, the Nigerian military and law enforcement agencies have launched a manhunt for the escaped prisoners. Still, the receding floodwaters and the breakdown of communication networks complicate these efforts. The instability caused by the jailbreak could undermine ongoing counterinsurgency efforts and lead to an increase in attacks on civilians, aid workers, and security personnel. The federal government has also approved ₦3 billion for each state of the federation to tackle all forms of natural disasters. The United Nations has mobilised for emergency assistance. However, the scale of the disaster presents a formidable challenge. Aid agencies struggle to reach some of the worst-affected areas due to flooded roads and damaged infrastructure. The humanitarian response focuses on providing the displaced with food, clean water, shelter, and medical care. Still, resources are stretched thin as the number of affected individuals continues to rise.

The September 2024 floods in Maiduguri have created a crisis with implications for security, humanitarian relief, and the economy. The mass jailbreak has heightened insecurity in an already volatile region. At the same time, the flood has exacerbated the humanitarian emergency, displacing hundreds of thousands and putting them at risk of disease and starvation. The economic damage is severe, with billions of naira lost in destroyed property and livelihoods. As Borno State grapples with the aftermath, a coordinated and sustained response from the Nigerian government and the international community is essential to mitigate the long-term impacts of this disaster.

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) remains one of the significant challenges facing Sierra Leone. This has had profound consequences for countless women and girls. Years of conflict, combined with deeply entrenched patriarchal norms and a weak legal framework, have set the stage for a culture of impunity, where survivors of violence live with the stigma, and their perpetrators are never held accountable. Despite some progress, especially with the declaration of a national emergency on rape by President Julius Maada Bio in 2019. SGBV remains deeply entrenched. 62 per cent of women between the ages of 15 and 49 have experienced sexual violence at least once in their lives. The cases range from domestic violence and rape to harmful traditional practices such as female genital mutilation, forced and early marriages. This issue is pervasive, affecting women and girls in urban and rural areas.

The legacy of Sierra Leone’s 11-year civil war, which ended in 2002, still lingers in the form of normalised violence against women. The war saw the emergence of rape as a dreaded weapon, where women were often victims of sexual violence at the hands of armed groups. However, over two decades since the official end of that conflict, trauma remains deeply embedded, as evidenced by the persistently high rates of sexual and gender-based violence across the country.  It is believed that the main reasons behind the persistence of SGBV in Sierra Leone are patriarchal attitudes and deep-seated gender norms. Women and girls continue to be viewed as men’s property in communities, with violence being an essential means of control. This is further cemented through practices such as FGM, which, though banned, is still practised in many parts of the country, and early marriages that expose young girls to violence, barring them from attaining education.

Additionally, social stigma often discourages survivors from reporting cases of SGBV. Women who come forward frequently face ostracism from their families and communities, leaving them isolated and vulnerable. This culture of silence perpetuates the cycle of violence, as most perpetrators face minimal or no punishment for their crimes. Also, due to the stigma, and a lack of trust in the legal system, most of the survivors do not report their cases, living in fear of reprisal from their abusers or in deep-seated disbelief in the possibility of justice being served. This is exacerbated by the general scarcity of resources available to survivors: although some NGOs provide essential services, the demand for help far exceeds the available support. Safe houses for survivors, trained counsellors, and lawyers remain scarce, especially outside big cities and towns.

Although the legal framework for addressing SGBV in Sierra Leone has increasingly improved, its implementation remains very poor. Thus, the 2012 Sexual Offences Act, amended in 2019, marked an important step toward criminalising rape and other forms of sexual violence. The 2019 amendments introduced life imprisonment for rapists, especially when the act involved minors. In that same year, President Bio issued a national emergency due to rape and sexual violence owing to an appalling surge in reported cases that included the rape and death of a five-year-old girl. The government also established special courts to expedite SGBV cases and created a national hotline for reporting incidents. Nevertheless, amidst these efforts, challenges persist in applying these laws. Corruption, lack of resources, and poor training of law enforcement officials often hamper the effective prosecution of SGBV cases.

International organisations such as UNICEF and UNFPA have supported government efforts to address SGBV. For instance, in 2023, UNICEF partnered with the government to roll out the Gender-Based Violence Information Management System, which aimed to capture cases of SGBV for policy and law reforms. UNFPA programmes, on the other hand, have aimed to prevent violence by promoting gender equality, economic empowerment, and education for women. Non-governmental organisations and civil society are also addressing SGBV in Sierra Leone. Organisations like the RAINBO Initiative and WAVES provide necessary services for survivors; these include medical treatments, counselling, and even legal advice. These organisations sensitise the community on sexual and gender-based violence, advocate for the rights of survivors, as well as lobby for strict laws that can give better protection for women and girls.  These efforts notwithstanding, there are still gaps in the fight against SGBV.

To effectively combat sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in Sierra Leone, it is crucial to adopt an approach that addresses the underlying causes while reinforcing the systems that protect survivors. First, it is imperative to strengthen law enforcement and the judiciary. Ensuring that cases of SGBV are handled with sensitivity and efficiency is vital for justice. This involves providing more resources and specialised training for police officers, prosecutors, and judges. Training should focus on reducing the re-traumatisation of survivors during investigations and trials, which is often a significant barrier to justice. Also, community engagement is essential. For instance, men and boys should be more involved in discussions challenging harmful gender norms and patriarchal attitudes. Community-based programs will be significant in changing attitudes toward gender roles and in reducing violence against women. The programs must promote mutual respect and equality at the daily interaction levels by addressing the root causes of violence at the local level.

In addition, investing in comprehensive services for survivors is needed. This would include increased access to safe houses, medical care, counselling, and legal assistance. More importantly, it involves empowering the woman or girl with education and economic opportunities that are key to preventing further violence. Empowered women and girls also have the potential to get out of abusive situations and rebuild their lives, thus working toward a sustained reduction in SGBV throughout Sierra Leone. SGBV is deeply entrenched in Sierra Leone and requires systemic and cultural transformation. Though some efforts have been made through legal reforms and the contributions of civil society, much remains to be done in the protection of women and girls from violence.

Banditry in Nigeria has become a significant security challenge, particularly in the northwestern regions of the country. The phenomenon involves armed groups, often referred to as “bandits,” who engage in criminal activities such as kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling, armed robbery, and attacks on villages. The situation has escalated over the past decade, contributing to a climate of insecurity and fear. The adverse effects of banditry are impacting multiple sectors, with agriculture being particularly affected. Many farmers are abandoning their farms out of fear of being attacked by bandits, leading to reduced food production. The reduced food supply is driving up prices, impacting the inflation rate at 33.4 per cent in July 2024 and further straining the economy. Banditry has not only caused the loss of lives and property but also displaced many citizens.

The Nigerian government has taken several steps to address banditry. Some state governments in the affected region have engaged in negotiations and peace talks with bandits. They have sometimes compensated bandit leaders and extended amnesty to those who renounce their operations. The federal government has also launched various military operations, such as Sharan Daji, Operation Harbin Kuanama, and Operation Thunder Strike, to counter bandits. According to Nextier’s Nigeria Volent Conflict Database, between June 2020 and August 2024, over 2,500 bandits have been killed due to formal and informal operations. To stifle bandits’ primary motivations for their operations, the government in 2020 decided to end ransom payments. In 2021, the Nigerian Senate considered passing an amended Terrorism Prevention Bill. The bill would have criminalised ransom payments and made it punishable by 15 years. The idea behind the bill was to discourage victim families from paying ransoms to bandits. However, these efforts to curb bandit activities have produced mixed outcomes, and Nigeria continues to grapple with the insecurity caused by banditry. Lives and properties are still being lost, and the threat remains persistent. Some experts have called for community mobilisation, mainly through community policing, as a strategy to combat banditry.

Community policing is one aspect of community mobilisation that focuses on collaborative and proactive partnerships between the police and the community. Community policing is not new to Nigeria. On April 27, 2004, former president Olusegun Obasanjo introduced community policing to a selected pilot division of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF). Since then, this has been the model the NPF has used. Yet community policing has not yielded encouraging results. Various studies noted that community policing in Nigeria has only been implemented in principle and not in practice. Several challenges hinder its effectiveness in Nigeria, contributing to its limited success.

A 2024 study revealed that while community members have a healthy relationship with the Nigeria Police Force, their collaboration concerning crime reduction has not been encouraging. One significant challenge is the Nigerian police force’s failure to adapt to changing technological trends. As crime continuously evolves, the inability to adjust to changing technological trends will only make fighting crime difficult. Additionally, adequate funding is crucial for an organisation to operate effectively. The police struggle with funding issues, which undermines the effectiveness of community policing and complicates its implementation. Insufficient funding may lead to inadequate salaries for police officers and a lack of essential training, impeding their ability to engage meaningfully with the community. Furthermore, a significant lack of trust in the police greatly impedes successful community policing efforts. In August 2024, bandits killed thirteen farmers whom they believed supplied information to security officers. Failure to protect people from brutal acts of bandits makes it difficult for the community to trust law enforcement officers and, in the same vein, makes community policing ineffective.

To effectively implement community policing, the government must address the issue of funding. Funding is essential for the day-to-day activities of law enforcement officers. Without adequate funding, the police force will be understaffed and ill-equipped to take on banditry and protect lives and properties. Proper funding means proper training that will help increase policing skills and management of crime and criminal activities. The Nigerian government must evaluate the federal budget and understand how to adequately fund the police, especially in areas where funding is required. Trust is an essential element of community policing. For community policing to work, then the police must build trust. This means taking crucial steps to protect informants who the police may rely on. The government must provide a framework that helps protect informants who provide vital information about bandits.

Other aspects of community mobilisation should be used alongside community policing to strengthen community policing. Community mobilisation strategies such as vigilante groups can help counter banditry. Various studies have shown that community efforts through vigilante groups help stem the tides of banditry. Another aspect of community mobilisation that can be used alongside community policing is empowering local authorities such as traditional rulers or chiefs. The government, civil societies, and international organisations can work with local authorities to raise awareness and create a support group that focuses on giving psychological support. Through the aid of traditional authorities, community members could be trained to use technological surveillance such as drones. Feedback and follow-up on implementation will also strengthen community policing because it allows community members to have a voice and give meaningful input on how to counter bandit activities. To get the best out of community policing, the government will need to provide the necessary funding and training to effectively collaborate with stakeholders and engage community leaders and members who are hit most by the activities of bandits. These efforts will contribute to building trust and enhancing the effective implementation of community mobilisation.

In the bustling streets of Monrovia, Liberia’s capital, the sight of children weaving through traffic, begging for alms, or scavenging through garbage has become all too familiar. These are the street children and abandoned youths of Liberia, a generation largely forgotten by society and marginalised by a nation struggling to rebuild after decades of conflict. Their plight is a glaring indictment of a country grappling with persistent poverty, inadequate social services, and the lingering aftershocks of civil war.

The figures are staggering. A 2022 survey by the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection (MGCSP) and UNICEF found that 366,584 children were living in “street situations” in a country with a population of just over five million.  Liberia’s weak social safety net exacerbates the plight of these children. The MGCSP, tasked with child welfare, is severely underfunded and understaffed. In 2022, the national budget allocated 0.5 per cent of government expenditure to social protection, a sum grossly inadequate to meet the needs of the country’s most vulnerable populations. As a result, NGOs and international organisations fill the void, but their commendable efforts are insufficient to stem the tide of children ending up on the streets.

Life on the streets is harsh. Street children, often referred to as “zogos” in Liberia, are exposed to a litany of dangers. Many are preyed upon by criminal gangs and drawn into a world of petty crime, drug abuse, and violence. Street children in Liberia have engaged in some form of criminal activity, often under duress or in exchange for basic necessities such as food and shelter.  Moreover, these children face severe health risks. Malnutrition is rampant, with UNICEF reporting that Liberia has high levels of childhood malnutrition, with a third of children under 5 stunted and 6 per cent acutely malnourished. The lack of access to clean water and sanitation facilities exacerbates their vulnerability to diseases like cholera and typhoid. Additionally, the spread of HIV/AIDS among street children is a growing concern, with limited access to healthcare services further endangering their lives.

Education, a potential lifeline, remains out of reach for most street children. The government’s free primary education policy has done little to benefit these children, who are often unable to attend school due to the need to earn a living or the stigma associated with their status. As a result, literacy rates among street children are low, with over 210,000 out-of-school children. The human cost of Liberia’s street children crisis extends beyond the immediate suffering of the children themselves. It is a problem that threatens the very fabric of the nation’s future. A generation of children growing up on the margins of society without access to education, healthcare, or basic protection is a generation at risk of perpetuating the cycle of poverty and violence that has plagued Liberia for decades.

Addressing the plight of Liberia’s street children requires more than just piecemeal interventions; it demands a comprehensive, multi-faceted approach. The government must prioritise child welfare in its policy agenda, increasing funding for social protection programmes and ensuring that the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection has the resources to safeguard vulnerable children effectively. International donors and NGOs have a crucial role to play as well, but their efforts must be better coordinated with the government to ensure that interventions are sustainable and tailored to the specific needs of Liberia’s street children. The Network for Empowerment Progressive Initiatives (NEPI) is making significant strides in ensuring that youth are taken off the streets and allowed to lead productive lives through its Sustainable Transformation for Youth in Liberia (STYL) programme. NEPI’s approach is holistic, targeting hardcore street youth with a comprehensive support system that includes cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) and counselling, crucial elements for addressing the underlying issues that drive these youths to anti-social behaviours. By providing these young individuals with the tools they need for social reintegration, coupled with financial support in the form of cash transfers, NEPI is empowering them to take control of their lives. These interventions encourage youth to participate actively in CBT, abandon anti-social behaviours, and gradually reintegrate into their communities. The programme also focuses on practical outcomes, such as helping youths open bank accounts and start new businesses, which not only fosters their financial independence but also contributes to the broader goal of creating safer communities. NEPI’s work underscores the belief that with the right support, even the most marginalised youth can transform their lives, making a positive impact on society as a whole.

In response to the alarming rise in the number of street children in Liberia, President Joseph Nyuma Boakai recently launched the “Street Child Project,” a bold initiative aimed at addressing the root causes of this crisis and providing long-term solutions for the country’s vulnerable youth. Drawing from his own experiences of a difficult childhood, President Boakai emphasised the importance of addressing issues like corruption and resource misuse, which have contributed to the abandonment of thousands of children. The project, titled “Support A Child, Save The Future,” is spearheaded by the MGCSP and aims to remove over 7,000 children from street situations within five years. The pilot phase, focusing on Montserrado County, will target the removal of 7,698 children while also empowering mothers and caregivers to ensure a holistic approach to child welfare. This initiative reflects the government’s commitment to safeguarding the well-being of Liberia’s future generations and tackling the challenges that keep children on the streets.

The challenges are immense, but they are not insurmountable. Liberia’s street children deserve more than just survival; they deserve the opportunity to thrive. As the country continues to rebuild and move towards a more stable future, it must not forget the most vulnerable members of its society. The fate of Liberia’s street children is inextricably linked to the fate of the nation itself. In their eyes lies the promise of a better tomorrow, one that can only be realised if Liberia takes decisive action today.