Policy Weekly

The Sahel has become an essential theatre of operation for foreign influence. Russia and China, responding to strategic and economic interests, have used misinformation and disinformation to extend their influence at the expense of, or in rivalry with, Western powers, especially the United States and France. These industrial-scale campaigns are now mainly promoted through social media and finding fertile ground in disaffected or vulnerable populations, exacerbating security and socio-economic crises. Consequences spill over into Nigeria, where misinformation fosters distrust, undermines regional stability, and undermines good governance.

This edition of the Nextier SPD Policy Weekly explores the strategic misinformation and disinformation efforts by Russia, China, and other actors in the Sahel, examining their impact on regional stability, security, and Nigeria’s geopolitical landscape.

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The 79^th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA79), held in September 2024, is remarkable in many ways, two of which are important for Africa. The first remarkable significance of UNGA79 is the adoption of the Pact for the Future as an outcome document of the Summit of the Future. The Pact aligns with the theme of this year’s high-level General Debate, which is: “Leaving no one behind: acting together for the advancement of peace, sustainable development and human dignity for present and future generations.” The Pact encapsulates negotiated international consensus for addressing contemporary challenges of the 21^st century while preparing the international system for future challenges. A second remarkable significance of UNGA79 is that it amplified the call for reform of the UN Security Council to enable greater inclusion and representation of African countries. Earlier, the United States had announced that it would support the addition of two permanent seats on the UN Security Council for Africa.

Despite the laudable outputs and opportunities offered by UNGA79, as evidenced by the Pact for the Future and debate on the addition of two permanent seats on the UN Security Council for Africa, UNGA79 falls short of expected attention to the critical challenge of stability in Africa, particularly the Sahel region. This edition of Nextier SPD Policy Weekly foregrounds the crisis of instability in the Sahel and identifies the gap in existing global initiatives for addressing the crisis in the region.

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The high-wire politics around local government elections in Nigeria since the reaffirmation of local government financial autonomy by the Supreme Court on July 11, 2024, points to fundamental questions about the value of local government first, as a legitimate service-providing entity and second as a vital base or structure for mobilising support and winning power. As a service-providing entity, the verdict of the Supreme Court revives the rationale for the 1976 local government reforms, which aimed to enhance popular participation and bring the government and its services closer to the people.

Winning the local government elections for each state governor is more or less a fait accompli because all institutions, including the electoral umpire of the state, are effectively under their control. Thus, council elections merely formalise the interests of the state governors regarding who is elected in local governments. Ultimately, the Supreme Court verdict on local government autonomy is a case of too little too late. In this edition of the Nextier SPD Policy Weekly, we analyse the local government elections and their outcomes and implications for federalism and control of local governance.

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Electoral violence is a critical challenge that undermines democratic processes globally. In many countries, elections marred by violence threaten the legitimacy of the electoral outcomes and often lead to widespread instability. Nigeria’s electoral history is riddled with incidents of violence, often exacerbated by the exploitation of identity politics and fierce competition for political power. Historically, the failure to prosecute those responsible for election-related violence has fostered an environment of impunity. This has encouraged political elites to use violence as a tool for political gain, knowing they are unlikely to face legal repercussions. The National Peace Committee (NPC), a coalition of religious, civil society, and political leaders, introduced the Peace Accord in 2015 to address this issue. This Accord is a voluntary pledge signed by political actors, committing them to peaceful conduct during and post-election elections. However, while the Peace Accord is hailed as a significant initiative to foster a peaceful electoral process, its effectiveness as a mechanism for achieving electoral justice remains debatable.

In light of these issues, this edition of the Nextier SPD Policy Weekly examines whether the Nigerian Peace Accord is a symbolic gesture or an effective tool for achieving electoral peace and justice. By identifying gaps and shortcomings in the current framework, evidence-based recommendations were formulated to strengthen the Peace Accord to mitigate electoral violence and foster peaceful transitions of power in Nigeria.

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On May 22, 2023, the $20 billion Dangote refinery was inaugurated in Lagos with great fanfare. With a daily production capacity of 650,000 barrels, it was anticipated that local refining by the Dangote refinery would end Nigeria’s fuel importation, opaque fuel subsidy regime, fuel shortages, price hikes, and many other challenges associated with the downstream sector of Nigeria’s oil industry. Over one year after the inauguration and with the commencement of production by the Dangote refinery on September 15, 2024, challenges relating to fuel importation and price hikes have remained features of the downstream sector of the Nigerian oil economy.

Building a local refinery in Nigeria promises many opportunities for investors, the Nigerian government, and the general public, at least in theory. However, recent experience with the Dangote refinery in Nigeria tends to question the promises of local refining. This edition of the Nextier SPD Policy Weekly explains why Nigerians’ hope for cheaper refined products from Dangote’s refinery may be stillborn, at least in the short term.

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Healthcare delivery and the system remain one sector in development that is often significantly impacted during violent conflicts such as wars and armed conflicts. In many instances, during violent conflicts or prolonged wars, health facilities are often targeted, either burnt down or looted. Also, healthcare personnel and even patients are threatened, physically assaulted or even prevented from either giving or receiving care. North East Nigeria, with more than fourteen years of active violent conflict arising from Boko Haram terrorist activities, is not exempted from such threats. Healthcare provisioning in the region has been impacted directly or indirectly by the violent situation, thereby redefining and distorting the healthcare system and delivery. For instance, in 2022, Nigeria recorded 43 incidents in which 37 health workers were kidnapped,11 health supplies were looted, and seven health workers were killed. A further breakdown of this data shows that 17 of these incidents happened in the Northeast states of Borno and Yobe.

However, the consequences of the conflict in the region extend beyond the immediate destruction of health infrastructure such as public and private hospitals, community health centres, ambulances, supply trucks, kidnapping or killing of health workers to the broader fabric of healthcare delivery, accessibility, and quality. This was in addition to an existing problem of neglect and underfunding

Thus, this week’s edition of the Nextier SPD Weekly Policy examines how conflict shapes health outcomes, resource allocation, and system resilience in Nigeria’s North East. It looks at the long—and short-term impacts of violent conflicts on Nigeria’s healthcare system and suggests measures to combat this escalating threat.

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The recent history of kidnapping in Nigeria goes back to the 1990s when Niger Delta militants used it for political pressure on government and multinational oil companies and for ransom to finance their activities. It later became a line of business when other criminals adopted kidnapping and commodified the value of people’s freedom and started exchanging it for ransom. It became a national nightmare when insurgents in the North East resorted to sourcing for comfort women and finances for their war chest. They introduced the dimension of mass abduction. The mass abduction practice of the insurgents, bandits, and suspected Fulani herdsmen does not respect boundaries, as their targets are mostly school children and women. It later extended to travellers on national and local highways.

High ransom demands, which victims’ families usually struggle to pay either alone or through crowdfunding, sustain the commerce of ransom for freedom. Between July 2023 and June 2024, Nigerians have paid an estimated ransom of ₦1,048,110,000, according to an SBM report. Also, further analysis of the kidnap figures within this period, by geo-political zones, states, and Local Government Areas (LGAs) according to Nextier’s Nigeria Violent Conflicts Database in terms of victims shows the three top rankings as North West, North Central and South West for (geo-political zones) Kaduna, Zamfara and Katsina (for states) and Chikun (Kaduna), Kajuru (Kaduna) and Munya (Niger) for LGAs. Although underreported, Kidnap for Ransom (KFR) in the country happens virtually daily. The government’s approach and attitude to the crime of kidnapping is reactive, takes the form of ad-hoc intervention, is top-down and lacks inclusiveness. The resulting gaps in managing the crime nurture its continuity and, unfortunately, make citizens see kidnapping and ransom payment as a new part of their everyday existence. However, further insights show that Nigerians are at a breaking point as their resilience has been badly battered. Therefore, this week’s edition of Nextier SPD Policy Weekly looks at the approaches and attitudes of the government that permit the continuity of kidnapping and explore exit routes from the crises.

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Over the past few decades, African countries have faced a persistent and escalating debt crisis. External debt service payments have surged dramatically, reaching an estimated $163 billion in 2024, a significant increase from $61 billion in 2010. The debt burden has led to defaults in several countries, including Zambia, Ghana, and Ethiopia, while others like Kenya, Angola, and Mozambique remain under significant debt stress.^[1] The consequences of this debt crisis extend beyond economic instability, profoundly impacting socio-economic development and progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 

In 2015, the United Nations adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a global agenda to address pressing global challenges and promote inclusive, sustainable development. For African countries, the SDGs represent a critical framework for achieving economic growth, reducing poverty, enhancing education and healthcare, and addressing environmental sustainability. The 17 SDGs and their 169 targets provide a comprehensive blueprint for development that aligns with Africa’s aspirations for economic and social advancement. However, the continent faces a significant obstacle: the burden of external debt. Many African countries allocate more resources to debt repayment than to SDG implementation. This diversion of funds hampers progress towards key development goals. With just six years remaining until the 2030 deadline, Africa will unlikely meet most of these ambitious targets. Of the 144 measurable SDG targets, the continent is on track to achieve only ten by 2030. 

This edition of the Nextier Policy Weekly explores the intricate relationship between the ongoing debt crisis in Africa and progress towards the SDGs. It seeks to understand how the debt burden impacts the ability of African countries to achieve key development goals and to identify the potential pathways through which debt management strategies can be aligned with sustainable development objectives.

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Between August 1 and 10, 2024, protesters poured into many Nigerian cities to express their discontent with governance in Nigeria, especially as it concerns the implementation of neoliberal economic policies, which manifest in the forms of subsidy removal from basic commodities and services such as fuel and electricity. Such protest is not new in Nigeria. In the past two decades, Nigeria has experienced three major nationwide protests – the 2012 Occupy Nigeria protest, the 2020 #EndSARS protest and the August 2024 #EndBadGovernance. The dominance of the youth as actors and victims of violence during the #EndBadGovernance protest in Nigeria, the absence of structured engagement between the youth and government before, during and after the protest, and the failure of the protest to address the yawning demands of the youth draws attention to the utility of youth-focused institutions in Nigeria. Youth-focused institutions are not in short supply in Nigeria. For instance, the National Youth Policy provides an overarching framework for addressing the needs and aspirations of the youth, while the National Youth Council of Nigeria (NYCN) was founded in 1964 and given legal recognition in 1990 to serve as the mouthpiece of the youth and the umbrella organisation for all youth organisations in the country. Despite these institutional arrangements, the conduct of the youth, as witnessed in the recent protest in Nigeria, shows that youth-focused institutions are yet to effectively provide the required framework for youth engagement.

Drawing from the experience of the recent #EndBadGovernance protest, this edition of the Nextier SPD Policy Weekly interrogates the waning utility of youth-focused institutions as platforms for youth engagement, particularly in times of crisis.

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