Ray of Hope?

In recent years, the southeast has been characterised by violent self-rule agitations currently championed by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Several violent incidents recorded in the region have been linked to IPOB by Nigerian security agencies. However, the group have vehemently denied those claims. Also, sit-at-home orders, a feature of the IPOB’s agitation style, have received widespread compliance in the region given that the enforcers have attacked some defaulters and government forces did not effectively protect lives and livelihoods on designated sit-at-home days. Other reasons for the region’s stay-at-home compliance may point to perceived sentiments for the group and its quest for emancipation and a sovereign Biafran state.

The arrest and consequent prosecution of IPOB’s leader, Nnamdi Kanu, did little to calm tensions in the region. On the contrary, the court trial of Mr Kanu brought a fresh wave of agitations with the sit-at-home orders extended beyond election days to include his court appearance days, IPOB designated memorable events and other times, for some ‘arbitrary reasons’. A few years earlier, IPOB’s activities were arguably less non-combative until the creation of its armed wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN). ESN was purportedly created to protect Igbo lives and properties, predominantly in the old eastern region. Its creation sped up the establishment of the Ebubeagu, a southeast regional informal security network. However, it also led to repressive efforts from the Nigerian government, in which the Presidency holds an indissolubility stance on the nation’s unity. As a result, recurrent reports from the region include combative operations, anecdotal accounts of extra-judicial killings, assassinations, kidnapping, attacks on security formations and other government establishments, accusations of human rights abuses, court appearances, and discourses on the marginalisation and secession question.

The discharge of Nnamdi Kanu by Nigeria’s Court of Appeal on October 13th, 2022, may suggest a dousing of the region’s tensions. However, such hopes may be premature. Before Kanu’s arrest, clashes between IPOB and the Nigerian forces had gone violent, with the Nigerian military’s reported attack on Kanu’s country home in 2017. There were also other violent incidents between separatists and security forces in the region. This incident at Kanu’s country home has been argued as his reason for jumping bail. Kanu’s arrest on June 27th 2021, did not stifle the IPOB’s activities as hinted earlier; instead, a new wave of violent struggles rocked the relatively peaceful southeast region. According to the Nextier Violent Conflict Database, 291 incidents leading to 528 deaths have been recorded in the southeast between June 27th, 2021 and September 30th, 2022. Some recorded incidents have been directly linked to IPOB, mainly by Nigerian security organisations. Some Nextier articles suggest that IPOB may have lost grip of its members and sympathisers, given that sit-at-home orders and enforcements have continued despite IPOB cancelling some of them. There are several instances where IPOB have reportedly denied involvement in the violent attacks or their indictment by Nigeria’s security organisations. Also, other criminal networks may have taken advantage of the southeast’s uncertain security atmosphere and the police-versus-IPOB blame game to carry out heinous activities in the region.

Despite the gloomy possibilities, Kanu’s discharge has positive takeaways and potential. First, it gives a sense of free and fair trial, as recommended by a Nextier article as a non-combative means of dousing violent tensions in the southeast. Second, it may push IPOB members to soft-pedal on ‘aggressive’ approaches to protest Kanu’s trial and their pursuit of self-determination. Third, it may motivate IPOB to be open for dialogue should the federal government show willingness to non-conflict interventions. Fourth, a reduction in tensions, ‘lesser’ sit-at-home days and jubilations on Kanu’s release will likely prevent more fatalities, help achieve relative stability in the region and address the socio-economic implications of the stay-at-home announcements. But, first, the Nigerian government and other relevant regional stakeholders must deploy some measures.

Addressing the southeast’s violence requires evidence and local engagement. Interventions in the region must be based on analysing the tracked incident information. It will provide insights for intervening actors on violence triggers, the modus operandi of armed actors and periods of attacks. This will also help identify and classify the violent actors. As mentioned in the preceding, other criminal elements, either secession group factions or independent actors, are likely capitalising on the uncertain security climate in the region. Therefore, a robust analysis of the data from the area will provide evidence for the government and relevant actors to intervene and manage the crisis. Reliable data and local intelligence will guide combative responses and ensure they do not complicate the security situation.

There is a need to commit more to non-conflict intervention approaches in addressing the region’s issues. As recommended in Nextier Policy Weekly, there is an urgent need to have separate dialogues with the two critical actors–the IPOB and the Federal Government–involved in the conflict. The dialogue should yield two critical outcomes which must take place to mark the beginning of the restorative process. The idea of dialogue is to discourage resorting to violence and encourage communicative engagement to document and address the region’s multi-layered issues.