Sahel Conflict: Shifting Power Dynamics and Counterterrorism

The Sahel region has long grappled with severe security and humanitarian crises stemming from weak governance, economic decline, and the worsening effects of climate change. Over the past decade, violence, conflict, and crime have surged, transcending national borders and posing significant challenges to countries both within and outside the region. The epicentres of this violence and humanitarian disaster lie in the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin subregions, where insurgencies, terrorist attacks, and violent extremism have destabilised fragile states and exacerbated poverty and displacement. Despite international intervention and counterterrorism efforts, the security situation in the Sahel region continues to deteriorate, with armed fighting spreading across porous borders and further impoverishing an embattled region. The worsening violence, driven by groups like the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP-GS), has triggered a massive displacement crisis, with thousands seeking sanctuary in neighbouring countries or further afield.

Certain factors contribute to weakening security capabilities in the Sahel region. For instance, unaddressed weak governance, characterised by corruption, democratic backsliding, legitimacy deficits, and human rights violations, has contributed to the expansion of violent extremism in the Sahel region. Increasing civilian casualties and several human rights violations by security forces in countries like Burkina Faso have further undermined regional and national efforts to combat extremism. Tensions and challenges within some Sahel countries’ military structures have also negatively impacted the region. For example, Burkina Faso’s human rights situation deteriorated in 2022 due to surging attacks by Islamist armed groups against civilians, violations committed by military forces and pro-government militias during counterterrorism operations, and political instability resulting from two military coups. Pro-government forces, including soldiers and militiamen from the state-sponsored Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), allegedly unlawfully killed dozens of suspects during counterterrorism operations, sometimes coordinating operations. Also, incidents of alleged extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances by security forces and VDP militias have been reported, such as the execution of 18 men near Djigoue in November 2022, the forced disappearance of six men arrested in Todiame in February, and the killing of over 50 men detained in and around Tougouri commune in August. There has been little progress in investigating past atrocities by the security services, such as the killings of over 200 men in Djibo in 2020 and the deaths of 12 men in gendarme custody in Tanwalbougou in 2020. An immunity provision in a 2021 decree creating a counterterrorism special force, which states that members “may not be prosecuted for acts committed in the exercise of their functions,” undermines accountability.

Security-focused responses have also recorded some shortcomings. France’s failure in Mali is yet another case, like the nearly two-decade intervention by the United States in Afghanistan, in which a Western power has intervened in an armed conflict abroad and proved unable to deliver on its goals regarding stability and security. France’s failure to define achievable objectives for Operation Barkhane beyond conducting strikes against jihadist leaders and providing Malian forces with general counterterrorism support and capacity building meant that the mission could have continued aimlessly for the foreseeable future. The limitations above explain why the French military operation Barkhane, as well as the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) advisory and training missions, have all failed in efficiently training the Sahelian defence and security forces as part of their counterterrorism efforts

The continuing collapse of international counterterrorism support, as well as weakening leadership in regional efforts, has created a vacuum in which violent extremism can expand. Also, the coup epidemic in the Sahel has severely undermined regional security efforts. Consecutive military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger have led to the collapse of the region’s security architecture. The derailing of constitutional order in these nations has deteriorated security, economic well-being for citizens. In Mali, following two military coups, the junta has alienated regional and international security partners, leading to the withdrawal of international forces and peacekeepers. This has allowed militant Islamist groups to exploit the security vacuum and consolidate power, leading to an escalation of violence and human rights violations. Similarly, in Burkina Faso, the military junta has taken a populist approach, expanding the arming of civilians and accelerating popular mass mobilisation. This has fuelled fears that Burkina Faso could become the next destination for a Wagner Group deployment, further escalating violence and human rights abuses.

As Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger choose to reinforce a purely military approach by collaborating with the Wagner Group, the escalation of violence and human rights violations is likely to continue. This has strained relations with traditional Western allies, leading to a shift towards Russia for security assistance. The withdrawal of French forces and the cessation of military cooperation with Burkina Faso have created a void Russia exploits through the Wagner Group. This has fueled concerns about the spread of Russian influence and the escalation of violence and human rights abuses in the region. The coup leaders in Niger have also ceased military cooperation with France, leading to the withdrawal of French forces. This has raised fears that Niger could become the next destination for the Wagner Group, further exacerbating the security vacuum and human rights concerns.

The security vacuum created by the withdrawal of international support and the deterioration of regional cooperation has provided an opportunity for violent extremist organisations to expand their influence in the region. Organisations like Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have capitalised on the security vacuum, using countries like Mali and Niger as platforms to launch indiscriminate attacks on government forces and civilians. As a result, violence has spilt over into neighbouring countries like Burkina Faso and Niger, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and democratic backsliding in the region. The grievances fuelled by the violence and instability have been exploited by extremist groups, leading to a vicious cycle of grievances and extremist exploitation. This has further undermined the security situation and weakened the ability of the governments to address the root causes of the violence and instability.

The deterioration of security conditions in the countries of the Sahel and their general vulnerability to non-state armed groups is the result of long-standing state weakness. Conversely, the activities of these armed groups have made it more difficult for states to build their administrative and military capacities. Democratic backsliding has occurred as a result. A reinforced security and law enforcement capacity must go hand-in-hand with more robust public institutions and more accountable governments capable of providing essential development services to the populations and appeasing internal tensions. Development processes, promotion of good governance, and improvement of the security situation need to be carried out in an appropriate sequence and coordinated manner to create sustainable stability in the region.

The Sahel region’s security challenges, political instability, and humanitarian crises demand an approach beyond military interventions alone. While counterterrorism efforts are crucial, they must be accompanied by strategies that address issues such as governance deficits, socio-economic disparities, and environmental degradation. Sustainable solutions require regional cooperation, inclusive political processes, and a commitment to protecting human rights and upholding the rule of law. Ultimately, the path to lasting peace and stability in the Sahel lies in empowering local communities, strengthening democratic institutions, and fostering economic development. Only by addressing the grievances that fuel extremism and promoting a sense of shared progress can the region break the vicious cycle of violence and instability. The international community must remain engaged, but the ultimate responsibility rests with the governments and people of the Sahel to forge a brighter future for their nations.