Trajectory of Terror

In many parts of Nigeria, gunmen are raiding communities and leaving a trail of dead bodies, destroyed infrastructure and socio-economic activities. The Nigerian government\’s responses have come short of preventing further losses to lives and livelihoods. Indeed, new violent conflict theatres have emerged, while others have spread beyond regions. Banditry, broadly a northwest Nigerian security crisis, has filtered into parts of the northcentral. For example, non-state armed actors had hoisted their flag in a captured community a few kilometres from Abuja, the nation\’s capital and headquarters of almost all federal institutions, including security structures. The audacity appears limitless.

Down south, gunmen activities fatally target suspected government and security personnel. There are also the torching of public infrastructure and the ruthless enforcement of sit-at-home orders. Now known explicitly for these challenges, the southeast region has moved from relative normalcy to an uncertain security climate. The novel scene in the area has become the norm. The region\’s woes are further complicated by an age-long, and now, more resounding secession agitations, currently championed by the proscribed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Easily, security responses in the region appear as a direct lethal attack against self-determination groups, whose membership and sympathy arguably cut across varying demographics in the now-troubled area.

In the northeast, particularly in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, more than a dozen years of insurgency has created a new normal of frequent terror attacks, underlying socio-economic and humanitarian gaps. While efforts are made to secure the region and save its populace from continued anguish, there is no clear end to the ideological war nor the follow-up humanitarian emergencies. Continued gunmen attacks are still significant risks in many locations in the region.

As the proliferation of non-state armed actors continues, many affected Nigerians strive to match it with resilience. However, there is only as much as homegrown resilience can go without adequate external support in the face of the terror\’s pervasive and recurrent trajectory. For example, many residents in the southeast have adjusted socio-economic activities to align with the rebellious sit-at-home orders dished out by the IPOB. In northern Nigeria, communities are also developing novel approaches to cope with the realities of violent conflict. For example, a study by Nextier SPD in 2019 revealed some endogenous efforts communities in northeast Nigeria have developed to cope with the insurgency.

Despite the apparent resilient spirit of many Nigerians caught in the conflict, there are apparent gaps and complications. Understudied communities show limitations, especially with partial or no external support. Moreover, macro-level violent conflicts are engendering new social order, economic needs, and avenues for new fierce struggles. Therefore, communities impacted by violent conflict require government and development partners\’ support as they struggle to survive wars and rebuild their lives. For this reason, there is a need to increase funding opportunities to assess community resilience efforts in troubled communities. The assessment can help the government and development partners to understand homegrown efforts that can be supported and replicated in similar scenarios. It will also help identify practices that can exacerbate conflict and undermine the government\’s responses.

Furthermore, as implied earlier, resilience can complicate responses to violent conflict and humanitarian crises if not effectively managed. Already, the government\’s largely ineffectual securitising violent conflict flashpoints leads to the emergence of self-defence militias. Self-defence militias are largely ethnic-based, which may be new triggers for group conflicts that manifest as religious tensions and inter-communal wars over land and potential socio-political gains. Sprouting self-defence groups will complicate formal security responses if they are not managed. Therefore, Nigeria must first improve securitisation to discourage the need for local militias. Second, there is a need to regulate the activities of informal security networks that are purportedly providing policing functions and complementing formal security organisations. The creation of regional and state-level vigilante networks should mean that the pool of different vigilante actors is pulled as one organisation for a more effective and result-based management. On the one hand, it is the gunmen\’s menace. On the other hand, it is the resilience of Nigerians. However, proactive steps of the Nigerian government and its development partners will help foster a better outcome for the country.