Beyond Early Warning 

When the issue of insecurity in Nigeria is analysed, it is often through the lens of the physical destruction it causes. Violence is narrowly viewed as physical, ignoring or neglecting the various kinds of violence that come with the chaotic activities of armed groups.  Nigeria’s policies and decision-making often reflect a narrow view of violence and its origins. Each incident of insecurity is met primarily with kinetic responses, such as the deployment of more boots on the ground, aerial bombardments of criminal camps, and the creation of task force operations. Nonetheless, policies toward insecurity fail to capture the comprehensive nature of violence and its causes. Nigeria operates a visibility-driven security logic where overt kinetic violence by non-state actors results in a prompt response, and other forms of harm (psychological, emotional, and economic) remain outside the realm of decision-making. 

The operation of a visibility-driven security logic comes with some concerning issues. First, it produces obstinate incentives in which communities affected by chronic insecurity escalate signals, such as self-survival strategies; though the escalation signals may be a secondary objective, it becomes necessary within a visibility-driven security logic system. Despite these signals, lives are lost, properties are destroyed, and people are displaced. Affected communities experience such tragedies not because of a lack of intelligence but because of strategic inaction. Though the Nigerian federal government has constructive knowledge of the issues these communities face, governments at all levels fail to utilise the gathered knowledge, resulting in inaction before escalation. In a visibility-driven security logic, failure to cross the last mile (acting before escalation) becomes more common, creating room for preventable deaths in high-risk regions to occur 

The visibility security framework that Nigeria operates exposes the limited understanding of violence. Violence begins when human security is actively eroded through the inability of the state to counter the presence of a threat. This failure allows violence to mature into physical harm, leaving many threatened communities at a loss. This limited understanding of violence and its origin is reflected in the way the Nigerian state responds to the threat of violence. Examples of these are seen in the federal government’s delayed actions, which came after the March 2026 bombings in Maiduguri and its response to the Jos massacre that occurred on March 29th, 2026. The Maiduguri bombing was not a result of the absence of intelligence but of failing to transform information into actionable knowledge. In other words, the threat is not addressed at its emergence point but rather when it crosses the threshold of visibility. The visibility security logic creates a pattern of acting after the fact, as in the case of Jos, when, after the massacre of at least 22 people, a 48-hour curfew was imposed. 

The federal and state governments have condemned the attacks in Borno and Plateau states. Also, the Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu deployed tactical assets and intelligence-driven reinforcements to affected regions. However, this has consistently been the pattern towards insecurity. It has become a predictable response cycle that produces the same results. The worsening situation of Nigeria calls for the urgent need to dismantle the visibility-driven security logic system and operate a preventive or anticipatory system.  

Violence originates at the moment the threat emerges, yet the system only responds once it becomes visible. It is therefore crucial that policy implementations aimed at addressing insecurity reflect this understanding of violence. There is a need for the federal, state, and local governments to act in a coordinated manner and utilise shared information. In information sharing, transparency is essential. The president must ensure that all security agencies do not withhold necessary information that pertains to preventing violence from occurring. Agencies that fail to adequately share information must be properly investigated and held accountable.  

The federal government must decentralise the response system to allow for a more efficient and adequate response to threats. This involves creating binding protocols that require action within a timeframe. There is a need to move beyond the federal level and create state and local early warning committees. This will ensure that credible information is acted upon, preventing delays and late responses.  

Nigeria’s worsening insecurity calls for a revamp of the security system the country operates. Policies aimed at addressing security challenges in the affected region must reflect a comprehensive understanding of violence. Violence is not merely physical harm, but rather it cuts across different spectrums. Therefore, adequate measures must be taken once a threat emerges. Response time must be improved drastically if stability and peace are to become a reality for the nation.